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Campaign Rhetoric and the Hide-and-Seek Game

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  • Sourav Bhattacharya
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    File URL: http://www.econ.pitt.edu/papers/Sourav_Aggregation-v5.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 326.

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    Date of creation: Jul 2006
    Date of revision: Jun 2007
    Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:326

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    1. Banks, Jeffrey S., 1990. "A model of electoral competition with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 309-325, April.
    2. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Scholarly Articles 4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers 199527, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    5. Polborn, Mattias K. & David T., Yi, 2006. "Informative Positive and Negative Campaigning," International Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(4), pages 351-371, October.
    6. Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
    7. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
    8. Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Hess, Gregory D., 1996. "A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 209-229, December.
    9. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    10. Shachat, Jason M., 2002. "Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 189-226, May.
    11. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and Seek in Arizona," Experimental 0312001, EconWPA.
    12. Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 709, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    13. Weingast, Barry R. & Wittman, Donald, 2008. "The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199548477.
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