Subjects played strategically similar 4x4 and 6x6 constant sum games under varying payoff scales. Substantial divergences from equilibrium predictions were exhibited. The dynamic pattern of play is best expalined by a stimulus learning model whereby players allocate weight to different actions according to their relative (time average) payoff experience in past plays. The results do not provide much support for the hypothesis that players select their best responses to beliefs about opponent play based on observed choice frequencies in past plays, modified by random errors or preference shocks.
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Paper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number
199625.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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