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Mixed strategies in strictly competitive games: A further test of the minimax hypothesis

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Author Info
Rapoport, Amnon
Boebel, Richard B.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 4 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 261-283
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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:261-283

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  2. Wilfred Amaldoss & Sanjay Jain, 2002. "An Analysis of the Impact of Social Factors on Purchase Behavior," Review of Marketing Science Working Papers 2-1-1021, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  3. John Wooders & Jason M. Shachat, 1997. "On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 97-34, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin Kuan Chong, 2003. "A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Pedro Rey-Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium Play and Best Reply to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0512003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Ganna Pogrebna & Pavlo Blavatskyy, 2009. "Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment," IEW - Working Papers iewwp403, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  7. Pedro Rey Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0506004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. John Van Huyck & Frederick Rankin & Raymond Battalio, 1999. "What Does it Take to Eliminate the use of a Strategy Strictly Dominated by a Mixture?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 129-150, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Giulio Bottazzi & Giovanna Devetag, 2002. "Coordination and Self-Organization in Minority Games: Experimental Evidence," ROCK Working Papers 019, Department of Computer and Management Sciences, University of Trento, Italy, revised 12 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Ganna Pogrebna & Pavlo Blavatskyy, 2009. "Coordination, focal points and voting in strategic situations: a natural experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 125-143, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and Seek in Arizona," Experimental 0312001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  12. gunnthorsdottir, anna & vragov, roumen & mccabe, kevin & seifert, stefan, 2007. "The meritocracy as a mechanism to overcome social dilemmas," MPRA Paper 2454, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 09 Apr 2007. [Downloadable!]
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