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Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions

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  • Jacob K. Goeree

    ()

  • Charles A. Holt

    ()

Abstract

This paper reports laboratory data for a series of two-person games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment for which behavior conforms quite nicely to the predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case we change a key payoff parameter in a manner that does not alter the equilibrium predictions, but this theoretically neutral payoff change has a major (often dramatic) effect on observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple economic intuition and with a model of iterated noisy introspection for one-shot games.

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File URL: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap333.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Virginia, Department of Economics in its series Virginia Economics Online Papers with number 333.

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Length: 40 pages JEL Classification: C72, C92
Date of creation: Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vir:virpap:333

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Web page: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/home.html

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Keywords: Nash equilibrium; noncooperative games; experiments; bounded rationality; introspection;

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