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Stochastic Game Theory: For Playing Games, Not Just for Doing Theory

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Author Info
Charles A. Holt ()
Jacob K. Goeree ()

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Abstract

Recent theoretical advances have dramatically increased the relevance of game theory for predicting human behavior in interactive situation. By relaxing the assumptions of perfect rationality and perfect foresight, we obtain much improved explanations of (i) initial decisions (ii)dynamic patterns of learning and adjustment, and (iii) equilibrium steady-state distributions.

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File URL: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap306.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Virginia, Department of Economics in its series Virginia Economics Online Papers with number 306.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Mar 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vir:virpap:306

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Web page: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/home.html

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Related research
Keywords: experiments; stochastic game theory; bounded rationality; quantal response equilibrium; introspection; learning; evolution;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  2. C. Monica Capra & Jacob K Goeree & Rosario Gomez & Charles A Holt, 2002. "Learning and Noisy Equilibrium Behavior in an Experimental Study of Imperfect Price Competition," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 613-636, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "A Model of Noisy Introspection," Virginia Economics Online Papers 343, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 333, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. C. Monica Capra et al., 1999. "Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 678-690, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Selten, Reinhard & Joachim Buchta, 1994. "Experimental Sealed Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions," Discussion Paper Serie B 270, University of Bonn, Germany.
  8. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2005. "An experimental study of costly coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 349-364, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin Kuan Chong, 2003. "A cognitive hierarchy theory of one-shot games: Some preliminary results," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000495, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2000. "Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 345, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Ido Erev & Alvin Roth & Robert Slonim & Greg Barron, 2007. "Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: Accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 29-51, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pedro Rey-Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium Play and Best Reply to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0512003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Simon P. Anderson & Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 1999. "The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies," Virginia Economics Online Papers 332, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Philip A. Haile & Ali Hortacsu & Grigory Kosenok, 0820. "On the Empirical Content of Quantal Response Equilibrium," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1432R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised Jun 0820. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Juin-Kuan Chong & Colin F. Camerer & Teck H. Ho, 2005. "A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000537, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Pedro Rey-Biel, 2007. "Equilibrium Play and Best Response to (Stated) Beliefs in Constant Sum Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 676.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Tilman Becker & Michael Carter & Jörg Naeve, 2005. "Experts Playing the Traveler's Dilemma," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 252/2005, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2003. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," NBER Working Papers 9889, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck H. & Chong, Juin-Kuan., 2000. "Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Working Papers 1087, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  12. Pedro Rey Biel, 2005. "Equilibrium Play and Best Response in Sequential Constant Sum Games," Experimental 0506004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Tilman Slembeck, 2000. "Learning in Economics: Where Do We Stand?," Microeconomics 0004007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  14. Daniel Houser & Michael Keane & Kevin McCabe, 2002. "Behavior in a dynamic decision problem: An analysis of experimental evidence using a bayesian type classification algorithm," Experimental 0211001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Colin Camerer & Teck H Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong & Keith Weigelt, 2003. "Strategic teaching and equilibrium models of repeated trust and entry games," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000506, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Theodore L. Turocy, 2002. "A Dynamic Homotopy Interpretation of Quantal Response Equilibrium Correspondences," Game Theory and Information 0212001, EconWPA, revised 16 Oct 2003. [Downloadable!]
  17. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "A Model of Noisy Introspection," Virginia Economics Online Papers 343, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  18. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Binary-Choice Games: Entry, Voting, Public Goods, and the Volunteers' Dilemma," Virginia Economics Online Papers 328, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  19. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, . "Asymmetric Inequality Aversion and Noisy Behavior in Alternating-Offer Bargaining Games," Virginia Economics Online Papers 329, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2000. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," Virginia Economics Online Papers 333, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Charles A. Holt & Jacob K. Goeree, . "An Experimental Study of Costly Coordination," Virginia Economics Online Papers 326, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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