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Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions

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  • Jacob K. Goeree
  • Charles A. Holt

Abstract

This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction of payoff asymmetries and noisy introspection about others' decisions.

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File URL: http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.91.5.1402
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 91 (2001)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
Pages: 1402-1422

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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:91:y:2001:i:5:p:1402-1422

Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.91.5.1402
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References

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