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Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory

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George J. Mailath

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Abstract

Evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling: when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational? And, when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a Nash equilibrium (and if it is reasonable, which equilibrium)? The traditional answers are not compelling, and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer. Evolutionary game theory suggests that, in a range of settings, agents do (eventually) play a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different Nash equilibria.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Literature.

Volume (Year): 36 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 1347-1374
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:36:y:1998:i:3:p:1347-1374

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