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One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?

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  • Sam Asher
  • Lorenzo Casaburi
  • Plamen Nikolov

    ()
    (Harvard University)

Abstract

We study how gradualism -- increasing required levels (“thresholds”) of contributions slowly over time rather than requiring a high level of contribution immediately -- affects individuals’ decisions to contribute to a public project. Using a laboratory binary choice minimum-effort coordination game, we randomly assign participants to three treatments: starting and continuing at a high threshold, starting at a low threshold but jumping to a high threshold after a few periods, and starting at a low threshold and gradually increasing the threshold over time (the “gradualism” treatment). We find that individuals coordinate most successfully at the high threshold in the gradualism treatment relative to the other two groups. We propose a theory based on belief updating to explain why gradualism works. We also discuss alternative explanations such as reinforcement learning, conditional cooperation, inertia, preference for consistency, and limited attention. Our findings point to a simple, voluntary mechanism to promote successful coordination when the capacity to impose sanctions is limited.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Namur, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1113.

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Length: 52 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nam:wpaper:1113

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Keywords: Gradualism; Coordination; Cooperation; Public Goods; Belief-based Learning; Laboratory Experiment;

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