1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-83, December.
2. Pitchik, Carolyn & Schotter, Andrew, 1986. "Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions," Working Papers 86-21, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
3. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Cadsby, Charles B & Frank, Murray & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 1990. "Pooling, Separating, and Semiseparating Equilibria in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 315-42. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Cox, James C & Smith, Vernon L & Walker, James M, 1985. "Experimental Development of Sealed-Bid Auction Theory: Calibrating Controls for Risk Aversion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(2), pages 160-65, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
7. Carolyn Pitchik & Andrew Schotter, 1988. "Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 363-388, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Pitchik, Carolyn & Schotter, Andrew, 1986. "Perfect Equilibria in Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 86-22, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
8. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1988. "Experimental Tests of a Sequential Equilibrium Reputation Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 1-36, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel, Joel., 1985. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Working Papers 565, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
13. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    Other versions:
    • Harsanyi, John C., 1994. "Games with Incomplete Information," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-1, Nobel Prize Committee. [Downloadable!]
14. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1997. "Predation, reputation , and entry deterrence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1460, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    • Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1980. "Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Discussion Papers 427, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
15. Miller, Ross M & Plott, Charles R, 1985. "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 837-72, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Miller, Ross M. & Plott, Charles R., . "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Working Papers 447, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
16. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Paul R. Milgrom & John Roberts, 1984. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 709, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
18. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Riley, John G, 1979. "Informational Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 331-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • John G. Riley, 1976. "Informational Equilibrium," UCLA Economics Working Papers 071, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
20. Berg, Joyce E, et al, 1986. "Controlling Preferences for Lotteries on Units of Experimental Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 281-306, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Ochs, Jack & Roth, Alvin E, 1989. "An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 355-84, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
24. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1985. " A Sequential Signalling Model of Convertible Debt Call Policy," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(5), pages 1263-81, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Klaus Abbink & Bettina Rockenbach, 2005. "Option Pricing by Students and Professional Traders: A Behavioural Investigation," Discussion Papers 2005-12, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
2. Gautam Goswami & Martin Grace & Michael Rebello, 2008. "Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 67-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Anderson, Christopher M. & Camerer, Colin F., 1999. "Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Sender-Receiver Signaling Games," Working Papers 1058, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
4. Klaus Abbink & Bettina Rockenbach, 2006. "Option pricing by students and professional traders: a behavioural investigation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(6), pages 497-510. [Downloadable!]
5. José Luis Lima R. & Javier Nuñez E., 2004. "Experimental Analysis of the Reputational Incentives in a Self Regulated Organization," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 194, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
6. Eichberger, Jürgen & Kelsey, David, 2003. "Sequential Two-Player Games with Ambiguity," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 03-27, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jürgen Eichberger & David Kelsey, 2004. "Sequential Two-Player Games With Ambiguity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(4), pages 1229-1261, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Potters, J & Winden, F. van, 1995. "Comparitive statics of a signaling game : an experimental study," Discussion Paper 126, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1996. "Comparative Statics of a Signaling Game: An Experimental Study," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 329-53.
8. Markus Pasche, 1998. "An Approach to Robust Decision Making: The Rationality of Heuristic Behavior," Working Paper Series B 1998-10, Friedrich-Schiller-Universit�t Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult�t. [Downloadable!]
9. Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Muller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Papers 09/08, Department of Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Mueller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling without common prior: An experiment," Discussion Papers 2009-08, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
   • Drouvelis, M. & Müller, W. & Possajennikov, A., 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Paper 2009-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
10. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Working Papers 0605, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2006. "Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00142849_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    • Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment," Post-Print halshs-00175051_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
    • Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2296, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    • Gary Charness & Antonio Cabrales & MARIE-CLAIRE VILLEVAL, 2007. "Competition, Hidden Information, And Efficiency: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 23-07, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    • Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment," Economics Working Papers we071909, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
11. Gary Charness & Marie Claire Villeval & Antonio Cabrales, 2009. "Hidden Information, Bargaining Power and Efficiency: An Experiment," Working Papers 2009-08, FEDEA. [Downloadable!]
12. Sopher, B. & Zapater, I., 1993. "Communication and Coordination in Signalling Games: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 93-26, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Barry Sopher & Inigo Zapater, 1998. "Communication and Coordination in Signalling Games: An Experimental Study," Departmental Working Papers 199803, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.