Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Learning about learning in games through experimental control of strategic interdependence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Shachat, Jason
  • Swarthout, J. Todd

Abstract

We report results from an experiment in which humans repeatedly play one of two games against a computer program that follows either a reinforcement or an experience weighted attraction learning algorithm. Our experiment shows these learning algorithms detect exploitable opportunities more sensitively than humans. Also, learning algorithms respond to detected payoff-increasing opportunities systematically; however, the responses are too weak to improve the algorithms' payoffs. Human play against various decision maker types does not vary significantly. These factors lead to a strong linear relationship between the humans' and algorithms' action choice proportions that is suggestive of the algorithms' best response correspondences.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165188911001801
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.

Volume (Year): 36 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 383-402

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:36:y:2012:i:3:p:383-402

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jedc

Related research

Keywords: Learning; Repeated games; Experiments; Simulation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ulrike Malmendier & Stefan Nagel, 2009. "Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences Affect Risk-Taking?," NBER Working Papers 14813, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Metrick, Andrew & Laibson, David I. & Choi, James J. & Madrian, Brigitte, 2009. "Reinforcement Learning and Savings Behavior," Scholarly Articles 4686777, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Reinhard Selten & Thorsten Chmura, 2005. "Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2x2 Games," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse33_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  4. Jason Shachat & J. Todd Swarthout, 2003. "Do We Detect and Exploit Mixed Strategy Play by Opponents?," Experimental 0310001, EconWPA.
  5. Pedro Dal Bo & Guillaume R. Frochette, 2011. "The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(1), pages 411-29, February.
  6. Dürsch, Peter & Kolb, Albert & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 63, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  7. Duffy, John, 2006. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 949-1011 Elsevier.
  8. Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2008. "Humans versus computer algorithms in repeated mixed strategy games," MPRA Paper 6672, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Shachat, Jason M., 2002. "Mixed Strategy Play and the Minimax Hypothesis," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 189-226, May.
  10. Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers 199527, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  11. Steven Gjerstad, 1995. "The rate of convergence of continuous fictitious play," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 161-178.
  12. Ernst Fehr & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2004. "Money Illusion and Coordination Failure," CESifo Working Paper Series 1141, CESifo Group Munich.
  13. Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1998. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 947-69, September.
  14. Duffy, John, 2001. "Learning to speculate: Experiments with artificial and real agents," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 25(3-4), pages 295-319, March.
  15. Cooper, Russell & DeJong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Ross, Thomas W., 1996. "Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 187-218, February.
  16. Jan Tuinstra & Joep Sonnemans & Cars Hommes & Peter Heemeijer, 2006. "Price Stability and Volatility in Markets with Positive and Negative Expectations Feedback: An Experimental Investigation," Working Papers wp06-18, Warwick Business School, Finance Group.
  17. James Andreoni & John H Miller, 1997. "Rational Cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma: experimental evidence," Levine's Working Paper Archive 670, David K. Levine.
  18. Robert W. Rosenthal & Jason Shachat & Mark Walker, 2003. "Hide and Seek in Arizona," Experimental 0312001, EconWPA.
  19. McCabe, Kevin & Houser, Daniel & Ryan, Lee & Smith, Vernon & Trouard, Ted, 2001. "A Functional Imaging Study of Cooperation in Two-Person reciprocal Exchange," MPRA Paper 5172, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  20. Yan Chen & Fang-Fang Tang, 1998. "Learning and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 633-662, June.
  21. Gary E. Bolton & Elena Katok, 2008. "Learning by Doing in the Newsvendor Problem: A Laboratory Investigation of the Role of Experience and Feedback," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 10(3), pages 519-538, September.
  22. Hommes, C.H., 2010. "The Heterogeneous Expectations Hypothesis: Some Evidence from the Lab," CeNDEF Working Papers 10-06, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
  23. Arijit Mukherji & David E. Runkle, 2000. "Learning to be unpredictable : an experimental study," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Spr, pages 14-20.
  24. Ho, Teck H. & Camerer, Colin F. & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2007. "Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning in games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 177-198, March.
  25. Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995. "Consistency and cautious fictitious play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
  26. Markose, Sheri & Arifovic, Jasmina & Sunder, Shyam, 2007. "Advances in experimental and agent-based modelling: Asset markets, economic networks, computational mechanism design and evolutionary game dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 1801-1807, June.
  27. Colin Camerer & Teck Ho & Kuan Chong, 2003. "Models of Thinking, Learning, and Teaching in Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 192-195, May.
  28. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  29. Juanjuan Zhang, 2010. "The Sound of Silence: Observational Learning in the U.S. Kidney Market," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(2), pages 315-335, 03-04.
  30. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck-Hua & Chong, Juin-Kuan, 2002. "Sophisticated Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 137-188, May.
  31. repec:fee:wpaper:1101 is not listed on IDEAS
  32. Yaw Nyarko & Andrew Schotter, 2002. "An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 971-1005, May.
  33. AJ A. Bostian & Charles A. Holt & Angela M. Smith, 2008. "Newsvendor "Pull-to-Center" Effect: Adaptive Learning in a Laboratory Experiment," Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, INFORMS, vol. 10(4), pages 590-608, July.
  34. Erev, Ido & Roth, Alvin E, 1998. "Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 848-81, September.
  35. Andreoni James & Miller John H., 1995. "Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 39-64, July.
  36. Eckel, Catherine C. & Grossman, Philip J., 1996. "Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 181-191, October.
  37. Bruno Contini & Roberto Leombruni & Matteo Richiardi, 2006. "Exploring a New ExpAce: The Complementarities between Experimental Economics and Agent-based Computational Economics," LABORatorio R. Revelli Working Papers Series 45, LABORatorio R. Revelli, Centre for Employment Studies.
  38. TeckH. Ho & Xin Wang & ColinF. Camerer, 2008. "Individual Differences in EWA Learning with Partial Payoff Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(525), pages 37-59, 01.
  39. Morgan, John & Sefton, Martin, 2002. "An Experimental Investigation of Unprofitable Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 123-146, July.
  40. Daniel Houser & Robert Kurzban, 2002. "Revisiting Kindness and Confusion in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1062-1069, September.
  41. Eyal Winter & Shmuel Zamir, 2005. "An Experiment With Ultimatum Bargaining In A Changing Environment," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 56(3), pages 363-385.
  42. Roth, Alvin E & Schoumaker, Francoise, 1983. "Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 362-72, June.
  43. Jordan J. S., 1993. "Three Problems in Learning Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 368-386, July.
  44. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April.
  45. Timothy C. Salmon, 2001. "An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1597-1628, November.
  46. Colin Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho, 1999. "Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 827-874, July.
  47. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 1998. "Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games: An Experiment in the Slovak Republic," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 66(3), pages 569-596, May.
  48. Walker, James M. & Smith, Vernon L. & Cox, James C., 1987. "Bidding behavior in first price sealed bid auctions : Use of computerized Nash competitors," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 239-244.
  49. Sonsino, Doron & Sirota, Julia, 2003. "Strategic pattern recognition--experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 390-411, August.
  50. Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October.
  51. Mookherjee Dilip & Sopher Barry, 1994. "Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 62-91, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Peter Dürsch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2005. "Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers," Working Papers 0423, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2005.
  2. repec:fee:wpaper:1101 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Spiliopoulos, Leonidas, 2008. "Humans versus computer algorithms in repeated mixed strategy games," MPRA Paper 6672, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Peter Duersch & Albert Kolb & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2010. "Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 407-430, June.
  5. repec:wyi:wpaper:002021 is not listed on IDEAS

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:36:y:2012:i:3:p:383-402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.