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Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game

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  • Antoine Terracol

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

  • Jonathan Vaksmann

    ()
    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne)

Abstract

This paper uses experimental data to examine the existence of a teaching strategy among boundedly rational players. If players realize that their own actions modify their opponents' beliefs and actions, they might play certain actions to this specific end and forego immedi- ate payoffs if the expected payoff gain from a teaching strategy is high enough. Our results support the existence of a teaching strategy in several ways. After exhibiting some regular- ities consistent with teaching, we examine more precisely the existence of such a strategy. First we show that players update their beliefs in order to take account of the reaction of their opponents to their own action. Second, we examine whether players actually use a teaching strategy by playing an action that induces a poor immediate payoff but is likely to modify the opponent's behavior so that a preferable outcome might emerge in the future. We find strong evidence of such a strategy in the data and confirm this finding within a logistic model that suggests that the future expected payoff that could arise from a teach- ing strategy has indeed a significant impact on choice probabilities. Finally, we investigate the effective impact of a teaching strategy on achieved outcomes and find that more tena- cious teachers can successfully use such a strategy in order to reach their favorite outcome at the expense of their opponents.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00607223.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Publication status: Published, Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization, 2009, 70, 1-2, 54-71
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00607223

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Keywords: Game theory; Teaching; Beliefs; Experiment;

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References

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  15. Kyle Hyndman & Erkut Y. Ozbay & Andrew Schotter & Wolf Ze’ev Ehrblatt, 2012. "Convergence: An Experimental Study Of Teaching And Learning In Repeated Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 573-604, 05.
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  21. Wolf Ze'ev Ehrblatt & Kyle Hyndman & Erkut Y. ÄOzbay & Andrew Schotter, 2006. "Convergence: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001148, David K. Levine.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bryan McCannon, 2011. "Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 263-273, April.
  2. Kyle Hyndman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Learning and sophistication in coordination games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 450-472, December.
  3. Timothy N. Cason & Sau-Him Paul Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2011. "Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assignment Game," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1267, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  4. David Danz & Dietmar Fehr & Dorothea Kübler, 2012. "Information and beliefs in a repeated normal-form game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 15(4), pages 622-640, December.
  5. Kyle Hyndman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2010. "Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00607238, HAL.
  6. Mengel, Friederike, 2008. "Learning by (limited) forward looking players," Research Memorandum 053, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).

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