Endogenous Timing In Duopoly Games: Stackelberg Or Cournot Equilibria
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Florida - College of Business Administration in its series Papers with number 88-4.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 1988
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, COLLEGE OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, GAINESVILLE FLORIDA 33620 U.S.A.
Phone: (352) 392-2397 x1399
Fax: (352) 392-2086
Web page: http://warrington.ufl.edu/
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duopolies ; theory of the firm ; game theory;
Other versions of this item:
- Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M., 1990. "Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 29-46, March.
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