Strategic interactions and belief formation: an experiment
AbstractTraditional models of belief formation in repeated games assume adaptive players who do not take strategic interactions into account. We find that these approaches are limited in the sense that people think more strategically and realize that, in contrast with the classical view, their own actions are likely to influence their opponents' behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal Applied Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 17 (2010)
Issue (Month): 17 ()
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Other versions of this item:
- Kyle Hyndman & Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2010. "Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00607238, HAL.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Wolf Ze'ev Ehrblatt & Kyle Hyndman & Erkut Y. ÄOzbay & Andrew Schotter, 2006. "Convergence: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001148, David K. Levine.
- Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2007.
"Dumbing down rational players : Learning and teaching in an experimental game,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
bla07017, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Terracol, Antoine & Vaksmann, Jonathan, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 54-71, May.
- Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2007. "Dumbing down rational players : learning and teaching in an experimental game," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00145436, HAL.
- Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," UniversitÃ© Paris1 PanthÃ©on-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00607223, HAL.
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- Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 749-64, May.
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