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Strategic interactions and belief formation: An experiment

  • Kyle Hyndman

    (Department of Economics - Southern Methodist University)

  • Antoine Terracol


    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics)

  • Jonathan Vaksmann


    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS)

Traditional models of belief formation in repeated games assume adaptive players who do not take strategic interactions into account. We find that these approaches are limited in the sense that people think more strategically and realize that, in contrast with the classical view, their own actions are likely to influence their opponents' behaviour.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) with number hal-00607238.

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Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis (Routledge): SSH Titles, 2010, 17 (17), pp.1681-1685. <10.1080/13504850903120691>
Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00607238
DOI: 10.1080/13504850903120691
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  1. Camerer, Colin F. & Ho, Teck H. & Chong, Juin-Kuan., 2000. "Sophisticated EWA Learning and Strategic Teaching in Repeated Games," Working Papers 1087, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Wolf Ze'ev Ehrblatt & Kyle Hyndman & Erkut Y. ÄOzbay & Andrew Schotter, 2006. "Convergence: An Experimental Study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001148, David K. Levine.
  3. Yaw Nyarko & Andrew Schotter, 2002. "An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 971-1005, May.
  4. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April.
  5. Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00607223, HAL.
  6. Battalio, Raymond & Samuelson, Larry & Van Huyck, John, 2001. "Optimization Incentives and Coordination Failure in Laboratory Stag Hunt Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 749-64, May.
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