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Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note

  • Florian Artinger

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Technical University Berlin)

  • Filippos Exadaktylos

    ()

    (University of Granada)

  • Hannes Koppel

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

  • Lauri Sääksvuori

    ()

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics)

The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the games. In this note, we present a procedure that allows the transparent use of the QSR even in multiple-choice scenarios. For that purpose, two methodological means are applied: an alternative representation of the score and a short learning period to familiarize subjects with the payoff mechanism. The results suggest that both means were necessary and successful in facilitating subjects’ understanding of the rule.

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File URL: http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers10_01.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 10/01.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 10 Feb 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:10/01
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