Monetary incentives, what are they good for?
This paper is a critical reflection on the use of monetary incentives in economic experiments. The argument is that incentives have their effect through their influence on one or more of three factors: (1) cognitive exertion; (2) motivational focus; (3) emotional triggers. I suggest that these effects can often be achieved without monetary incentives, and incentives are not even guaranteed to achieve those effects. There are also disadvantages to requiring the use of incentives in experiments. The paper concludes by suggesting there is no basis for requiring the use of real incentives to do experimental economics.
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Volume (Year): 12 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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References listed on IDEAS
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