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Learning and sophistication in coordination games

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  • Kyle Hyndman

    ()

  • Antoine Terracol

    ()

  • Jonathan Vaksmann

    ()

Abstract

This paper studies the role of strategic teaching in coordination games and whether changing the incentives of players to teach leads to more efficient coordination. We ran experiments where subjects played one of four coordination games in constant pairings, where the incentives to teach were varied along two dimensions--the short run cost of teaching and the long run benefit to teaching. We show which aspects of the game lead subjects to adopt long run teaching strategies, and show that subjects try to manipulate their opponent's actions to pull them out of a situation of coordination failure. We also show that extending a model of decision making by introducing a forward-looking component helps to track teachers' behaviour more accurately, and describes the way players behave in a more unified way across both teachers and learners.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Experimental Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 450-472

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Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:12:y:2009:i:4:p:450-472

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102888

Related research

Keywords: Game theory; Learning; Teaching; Coordination; Experiment; C91; D43; D83;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Sam Asher & Lorenzo Casaburi & Plamen Nikolov, 2011. "One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?," Working Papers 1113, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
  2. Timothy Cason & Sau-Him Lau & Vai-Lam Mui, 2013. "Learning, teaching, and turn taking in the repeated assignment game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 335-357, October.
  3. Bryan McCannon, 2011. "Coordination between a sophisticated and fictitious player," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(3), pages 263-273, April.

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