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Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assignment Game

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  • Timothy N. Cason
  • Sau-Him Paul Lau
  • Vai-Lam Mui

Abstract

History-dependent strategies are often used to support cooperation in repeated game models. Using the indefinitely repeated common-pool resource assignment game and a perfect stranger experimental design, this paper reports novel evidence that players who have successfully used an efficiency-enhancing turn-taking strategy will teach other players in subsequent supergames to adopt this strategy. We find that subjects engage in turn taking frequently in both the Low Conflict and the High Conflict treatments. Prior experience with turn taking significantly increases turn taking in both treatments. Moreover, successful turn taking often involves fast learning, and individuals with turn taking experience are more likely to be teachers than inexperienced individuals. The comparative statics results show that teaching in such an environment also responds to incentives, since teaching is empirically more frequent in the Low Conflict treatment with higher benefits and lower costs.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1267.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1267

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Related research

Keywords: Learning; Teaching; Assignment Game; Laboratory Experiment; Repeated Games; Turn Taking; Common-Pool Resources;

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References

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  1. Kyle Hyndman & Erkut Y. Ozbay & Andrew Schotter & Wolf Ze’ev Ehrblatt, 2012. "Convergence: An Experimental Study Of Teaching And Learning In Repeated Games," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 573-604, 05.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Christoph Kuzmics & Thomas Palfrey & Brian W. Rogers, 2012. "Symmetric play in repeated allocation games," Working Papers 468, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  2. Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle & Ze’ev Shtudiner, 2013. "Waiting To Cooperate?," Working Papers 1314, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
  3. Todd R. Kaplan & Bradley J. Ruffle, 2012. "Which Way to Cooperate," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(563), pages 1042-1068, 09.

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