Group Size and Cooperation among Strangers
AbstractWe study how group size affects cooperation in an infinitely repeated n-player Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. In each repetition of the game, groups of size n less than or equal to M are randomly and anonymously matched from a fixed population of size M to play the n-player PD stage game. We provide conditions for which the contagious strategy (Kandori, 1992) sustains a social norm of cooperation among all M players. Our main finding is that if agents are sufficiently patient, a social norm of society-wide cooperation becomes easier to sustain under the contagious strategy as n converges to M.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Concordia University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 12010.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 12 Sep 2012
Date of revision:
Cooperation; Social Norms; Group Size; Repeated Games; Random Matching; Prisoner's Dilemma;
Other versions of this item:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-11-24 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2012-11-24 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2012-11-24 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-11-24 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-11-24 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-11-24 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2012-11-24 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-11-24 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Pedro Dal Bo, 2001.
"Social Norms, Cooperation and Inequality,"
UCLA Economics Working Papers
802, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ellison, Glenn, 1994.
"Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 567-88, July.
- Glen Ellison, 2010. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," Levine's Working Paper Archive 631, David K. Levine.
- Okada, Akira, 1993. " The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(3), pages 629-56, November.
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