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Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Jeffrey Carpenter ()
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Standard game theoretic models predict, based on subgame perfection, that public goods will not be provided even if agents are allowed to monitor free riders at some cost. Further, because punishment is not credible in these environments, this prediction is invariant to the size of groups. However, there is now substantial evidence that people are reciprocally motivated and will punish free riders, regardless of the material costs of doing so. To examine the implications of reciprocally-minded agents, we simulate an environment populated with the behavioral strategies often seen in the experimental lab and use the simulation to develop hypotheses that are more specific about why group size should matter when sanctions are allowed. We then test these hypotheses experimentally using the voluntary contribution mechanism. We examine whether the effect of group members or if information about other group members is what is important. We find large groups provide public goods at levels no less than small groups because punishment does not fall in large groups. However, hindrances to monitoring do reduce the provision of the public good.
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Paper provided by Middlebury College, Department of Economics in its series Middlebury College Working Paper Series with number
0206.
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Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2002Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0206Contact details of provider:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Janine Podraza).
Keywords: Public Goods ; Mutual Monitoring ; Group Soze ; Experiment ; Simulation ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Computational Techniques C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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