This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2003-10-20 (All new papers)
• NEP-CBE-2003-10-20 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
• NEP-EXP-2003-10-20 (Experimental Economics)
• NEP-PBE-2003-10-20 (Public Economics)
• NEP-POL-2003-10-20 (Positive Political Economics)

1. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 1998. "Mutual Monitoring in Teams: The Effects of Residual Claimancy and Reciprocity," Research in Economics 98-08-074e, Santa Fe Institute. [Downloadable!]
2. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
3. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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   • Carpenter, Jeffrey & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 1347, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Sethi, Rajiv, 1996. "Evolutionary stability and social norms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 113-140, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Anderson, Christopher M. & Putterman, Louis, 2006. "Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-24, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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   • Louis Putterman & Christopher M. Anderson, 2003. "Do Non-strategic Sanctions Obey the Law of Demand? The Demand for Punishment in the Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Working Papers 2003-15, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
6. Camerer, Colin F & Thaler, Richard H, 1995. "Ultimatums, Dictators and Manners," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 209-19, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Strong Reciprocity and Human Sociality," Working Papers 2000-02, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. repec:att:wimass:199323 is not listed on IDEAS
9. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2006. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Caepr Working Papers 2006-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington, revised Aug 2006. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Martin Sefton & Robert S. Shupp & James Walker, 2005. "The Effect of Rewards and Sanctions in Provision of Public Goods," Working Papers 200504, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
   • Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2007. "The Effect Of Rewards And Sanctions In Provision Of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 671-690, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0206, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 1337, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    • Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Annamaria Nese & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2009. "Individuals' Voting Choice and Cooperation in Repeated Social Dilemma Games," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena 025, University of Siena. [Downloadable!]
2. Reuben E., 2002. "Interest groups and politics: The need to concentrate on group formation," Public Economics 0212001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
3. Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2005. "Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0503, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2005. "Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or Reciprocity?," IZA Discussion Papers 1583, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
4. Visser, Martine, 2006. "Welfare Implications of Peer Punishment in Unequal Societies," Working Papers in Economics 218, Göteborg University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Meijerink, Gerdien, 2007. "If services aren't delivered, people won't pay: the role of measurement problems and monitoring in Payments for Environmental Services," 106th Seminar, October 25-27, 2007, Montpellier, France 7948, European Association of Agricultural Economists. [Downloadable!]
6. Robert Prasch, 2003. "How is Labor Distinct From Broccoli? Some Unique Characteristics of Labor and Their Importance for Economic Analysis and Policy," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 03-30, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]