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Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?

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  • Miller, John H.
  • Andreoni, James

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 36 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 9-15

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:36:y:1991:i:1:p:9-15

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Cited by:
  1. Soliman, Amal & Jones, Philip & Cullis, John, 2014. "Learning in experiments: Dynamic interaction of policy variables designed to deter tax evasion," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 175-186.
  2. Marco Casari, 2002. "Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? An application to common property resources," UFAE and IAE Working Papers, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) 542.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Benchekroun, Hassan & Long, Ngo Van, 2008. "The build-up of cooperative behavior among non-cooperative selfish agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 239-252, July.
  4. Gary Bolton, 1998. "Bargaining and Dilemma Games: From Laboratory Data Towards Theoretical Synthesis," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 257-281, December.
  5. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July.
  6. Andreoni, J. & Miller, J.H., 1996. "Giving According to GARP: An Experimental Study of Rationality and Altruism," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9601, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  7. Marianna Baggio & Luigi Mittone, 2014. "An experimental approach to generational heterogeneity," CEEL Working Papers, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia 1404, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  8. Masel, Joanna, 2007. "A Bayesian model of quasi-magical thinking can explain observed cooperation in the public good game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 216-231, October.
  9. Luigi Mittone & Francesca Bortolami, 2007. "Free riding and norms of control: self determination and imposition. An experimental comparison," CEEL Working Papers, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia 0704, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
  10. Juan D. Montoro-Pons, 2000. "Collective Action, Free Riding And Evolution," Computing in Economics and Finance 2000, Society for Computational Economics 279, Society for Computational Economics.
  11. Ochs, Jack, 1996. "Experimental economics : Douglas D. Davis and Charles A. Holt, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993), pp xi+571," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 411-416, September.
  12. Anderson, Simon P. & Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 1998. "A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 297-323, November.
  13. Gale, John & Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1995. "Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 56-90.
  14. Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "When In Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series, Middlebury College, Department of Economics 0217, Middlebury College, Department of Economics.
  15. Roth, Alvin E. & Erev, Ido, 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 164-212.
  16. Sonnemans, Joep, 1998. "Strategies of search," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 309-332, April.
  17. Arifovic, Jasmina & Ledyard, John, 2012. "Individual evolutionary learning, other-regarding preferences, and the voluntary contributions mechanism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 808-823.
  18. Jasmina Arifovic & John Ledyard, 2012. "Individual Evolutionary Learning, Other-regarding Preferences, and the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Discussion Papers wp12-01, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.

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