Evolutionary stability and social norms

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Evolutionary stability and social norms

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Sethi, Rajiv

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Rajiv Sethi

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 29 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 113-140
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:29:y:1996:i:1:p:113-140

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Herold, Florian, 2003. "Carrot or Stick? Group Selection and the Evolution of Reciprocal Preferences," Discussion Papers in Economics 40, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Markus Pasche, 1998. "An Approach to Robust Decision Making: The Rationality of Heuristic Behavior," Working Paper Series B 1998-10, Friedrich-Schiller-Universitï¿½t Jena, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultï¿½t. [Downloadable!]
Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2002. "Norm compliance and strong reciprocity," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 02-03, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Rajiv Sethi & E. Somanathan, 2001. "Norm Compliance and Strong Reciprocity," Working Papers 01-09-048, Santa Fe Institute.
Peter Matthews & Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0213, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews & Okomboli Ong'ong'a, 2003. "Why Punish: Social Reciprocity and the Enforcement of Prosocial Norms," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0213r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews & Okomboli Ong’ong’a, 2004. "Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 407-429, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lanse P. Minkler & Thomas J. Miceli, 2002. "Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation," Working papers 2002-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Lanse P. Minkler & Thomas J. Miceli, 2002. "Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation," Working papers 2002-36, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Lanse Minkler & Thomas Miceli, 2004. "Lying, Integrity, and Cooperation," Review of Social Economy, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 62(1), pages 27-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ofer H. Azar, 2003. "What sustains social norms and how they evolve? The case of tipping," Others 0309001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Azar, Ofer H., 2004. "What sustains social norms and how they evolve?: The case of tipping," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 49-64, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carpenter, Jeffrey & Matthews, Peter Hans, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," IZA Discussion Papers 1347, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Hans Matthews, 2004. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229r, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Jeffrey Carpenter & Peter Matthews, 2002. "Social Reciprocity," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0229, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Thomas J. Miceli & Alanson P. Minkler, 1997. "Preferences, cooperation, and Institutions," Working papers 1997-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Poulsen, Anders, 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Working Papers 01-3, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Poulsen, A., 2001. "Reciprocity, Materialism and Welfare: An Evolutionary Model," Papers 01-3, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
Rajiv Sethi & E.Somanathan, 2002. "Understanding reciprocity," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 02-05, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "Punishing Free-Riders: How Group Size Affects Mutual Monitoring and the Provision of Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 1337, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "Punishing Free Riders: how group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0206, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jeffrey Carpenter, 2002. "When In Rome: Conformity and the Provision of Public Goods," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0217, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2004. "When in Rome: conformity and the provision of public goods," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 395-408, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Azar, Ofer H., 2002. "Evolution of social norms with heterogeneous preferences: A general model and an application to the academic review process," MPRA Paper 4482, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Azar, Ofer H., 2008. "Evolution of social norms with heterogeneous preferences: A general model and an application to the academic review process," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 420-435, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The Role of Moral Values in the Economic Analysis of Crime: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economics Working Papers 245, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]

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