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On the Existence and Stability of Pareto Optimal Endogenous Matching with Fairness

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  • Dai, Darong
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    Abstract

    In the current paper, we study the asymmetric normal-form game between two heterogeneous groups of populations by employing the stochastic replicator dynamics driven by Lévy process. A new game equilibrium, i.e., the game equilibrium of a stochastic differential cooperative game on time, is derived by introducing optimal-stopping technique into evolutionary game theory, which combines with the Pareto optimal standard leads us to the existence of Pareto optimal endogenous matching. Moreover, stability of the Pareto optimal endogenous matching is confirmed by essentially using the well-known Girsanov Theorem.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 40560.

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    Date of creation: 08 Aug 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:40560

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    Keywords: Stochastic differential cooperative game on time; Endogenous matching; Stability; Fairness; Adaptive learning;

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