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The evolution of economic institutions as a propagation process

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  • Ulrich Witt

Abstract

Based on some notions from recent game theoretic approaches to explain the emergence of institutions, a model is put forward which implies some generalizations and extensions. First, the evolution of institutions is interpreted as a diffusion process. This interpretation provides a general formal framework to cover both, the case of strategic and that of non-strategic interaction. Second, different forms of interdependency effects between the individuals involved are identified as making the crucial difference between the case where institutions emerge spontaneously in an unorganized form and the case where they do not. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989

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  • Ulrich Witt, 1989. "The evolution of economic institutions as a propagation process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 155-172, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:62:y:1989:i:2:p:155-172
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00124332
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    Cited by:

    1. Nadia von Jacobi & Vito Amendolagine, 2021. "What Feeds on What? Networks of Interdependencies between Culture and Institutions," DEM Working Papers 2021/13, Department of Economics and Management.
    2. Julia Sophie Woersdorfer, 2008. "From Status-Seeking Consumption to Social Norms. An Application to the Consumption of Cleanliness," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2008-10, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    3. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "The origins of social institutions," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 215-240, April.
    4. Christian Cordes & Christian Schubert, 2007. "Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 35-62, March.
    5. Schneider, Volker, 2001. "Die Transformation der Telekommunikation: Vom Staatsmonopol zum globalen Markt (1800-2000)," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 41, number 41.
    6. Nikolay Nenovsky & Yorgos Rizopoulos, 2004. "Peut-on mesurer le changement institutionnel du régime monétaire ?," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 75(2), pages 17-36.
    7. Sandye Gloria, 2019. "From Methodological Individualism to Complexity: The Case of Ludwig Lachmann," Post-Print halshs-02345495, HAL.
    8. William H. Kaempfer & Anton D. Lowenberg, 1993. "A Threshold Model of Electoral Policy and Voter Turnout," Rationality and Society, , vol. 5(1), pages 107-126, January.
    9. Priddat, Birger P., 2008. "Öffentliche Güter als politische Güter," ZögU - Zeitschrift für öffentliche und gemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 31(2), pages 152-173.
    10. Nadia von Jacobi & Vito Amendolagine, 2022. "What Feeds on What? Networks of Interdependencies between Culture and Institutions," Working Papers 11, SITES.
    11. Christopher Andrew HARTWELL, 2015. "Baudrillard Goes to Kyiv: Institutional Simulacra in Transition," Journal of Economic and Social Thought, KSP Journals, vol. 2(2), pages 92-105, June.
    12. K. Chandrasekhar & Saradindu Bhaduri, 2006. "Vicarious Learning and Socio-Economic Transformation in Indian Trans-Himalaya: An evolutionary tale of economic development and policy making," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-18, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
    13. Bianchi, Marina, 1995. "Markets and firms Transaction costs versus strategic innovation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 183-202, October.
    14. Nick Cowen & Aris Trantidis, 2022. "Peter J. Boettke and Solomon M. Stein (eds.), Buchanan’s tensions: reexamining the political economy and philosophy of James M. Buchanan, Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 201," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 277-283, April.
    15. Fritz W. Scharpf, 1990. "Games Real Actors Could Play," Rationality and Society, , vol. 2(4), pages 471-494, October.
    16. Julia Sophie Woersdorfer, 2010. "When Do Social Norms Replace Status‐Seeking Consumption? An Application To The Consumption Of Cleanliness," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(1), pages 35-67, February.
    17. Leo Wangler, 2010. "Renewables and Innovation - Empirical Assessment and Theoretical Considerations," Jena Economics Research Papers 2010-002, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    18. Kai Brandt, "undated". "Numerical Solution of Huge Sets of Nonlinear Differential Equations: The Coupling of Open Economic Systems," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _010, Society for Computational Economics.
    19. Ulrich Witt, 2009. "Novelty and the bounds of unknowledge in economics," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(4), pages 361-375.
    20. Sandye Gloria, 2019. "From Methodological Individualism to Complexity: The Case of Ludwig Lachmann," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(2), pages 216-232, April.
    21. Sarkar, Jayati, 1998. "Technological Diffusion: Alternative Theories and Historical Evidence," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 131-176, April.
    22. Christian Schubert, 2006. "Fairness in Urban Land Use: An Evolutionary Contribution to Law & Economics," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-22, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.

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