Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

A Pure Theory of Strategic Behavior and Social Institutions


Author Info

  • Thompson, Earl A
  • Faith, Roger L
Registered author(s):


    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL:
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See for details.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 71 (1981)
    Issue (Month): 3 (June)
    Pages: 366-80

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:71:y:1981:i:3:p:366-80

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page:
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:

    Related research



    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Hermalin, Benjamin E., 2007. "Leading for the long term," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-19, January.
    2. José Casas–Pardo & Juan Montoro–Pons, 2001. "On Norms and Coordination Games: A Rent–Seeking Approach," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 237-253, September.
    3. Hermann Brandstätter & Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, . "Philosophical, Psychological and Economic Aspects of Choice Making," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2003-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    4. Don Allison & Thomas Borcherding, 2013. "A tribute to Earl A. Thompson and, in his own words, a summary of his general economic and social theory," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 7-29, July.
    5. Ulrich Witt, 1989. "The evolution of economic institutions as a propagation process," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 62(2), pages 155-172, August.
    6. Jack Hirshleifer, 1987. "The Analytics of Continuing Conflict," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 467A, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Jack Hirshleifer, 1992. "Anarchy and Its Breakdown," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 674, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Earl Thompson, 2000. "Why World Oil Monopolization Lowers Oil Prices: A Theory of Involuntary Cartelization," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(1), pages 63-78.
    9. Jack Hirshleifer, 1984. "On the Emotions as Guarantors of Threats and Promises," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 337, UCLA Department of Economics.
    10. Randall Holcombe & Asghar Zardkoohi, 1983. "On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 165-174, January.
    11. Mark W. Plant, 1984. "Testin Linear REstrictions in Two-Stage Least Squares Regressions," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 336, UCLA Department of Economics.
    12. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement, and transaction costs: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 227-253, April.
    13. Earl A. Thompson, 1982. "Underinvestment Traps and Potential Cooperation," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 260, UCLA Department of Economics.
    14. Earl A. Thompson & Charles R. Hickson, 2006. "Predicting bubbles," Global Business and Economics Review, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 8(3/4), pages 217-246.


    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:71:y:1981:i:3:p:366-80. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jane Voros) or (Michael P. Albert).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.