Fairness in Urban Land Use: An Evolutionary Contribution to Law & Economics
AbstractMarkets for complex, multi-faceted goods normally require a complex institutional framework to function properly, i.e., to lead to patterns of outcomes that are deemed acceptable by the individuals involved. This paper examines the institutional underpinnings of the market for urban land use rights, taking both German and U.S. public and private land use law as a case in point. Apart from efficiency considerations that have been discussed in the literature, the individuals' preferences regarding the fairness of (i) the contents of urban land use rights and (ii) the distribution of costs and benefits induced by innovative land uses have been largely neglected. It is argued that investigating the impact of these preferences (and the underlying informal fairness norms) on the legal treatment of land use rights provides a key opportunity to construct an alternative Law & Economics approach that is compatible with an evolutionary perspective on economic land use decisions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2005-22.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2006
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- R13 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - General Equilibrium and Welfare Economic Analysis of Regional Economies
- R14 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Land Use Patterns
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2006-12-16 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-12-16 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2006-12-16 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2006-12-16 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-URE-2006-12-16 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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