Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?
AbstractIn constitutional political economy, the citizensÃ¢â¬â¢ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interest are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizensÃ¢â¬â¢ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 19 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Constitutional preferences; Social contract; Original position; Innovation; Risk preferences; D72; H10; O33;
Other versions of this item:
- U. Witt & C. Schubert, 2008. "Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How Much Do We Need to Know about Risk Preferences?," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2008-03, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
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