Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How Much Do We Need to Know about Risk Preferences?
AbstractIn constitutional political economy, the citizensâ€™ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interest are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizensâ€™ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2008-03.
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Ulrich Witt & Christian Schubert, 2008. "Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 203-225, September.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-IPR-2008-05-17 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-POL-2008-05-17 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2008-05-17 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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