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Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How Much Do We Need to Know about Risk Preferences?

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Author Info
U. Witt ()
C. Schubert ()

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Abstract

In constitutional political economy, the citizens’ constitutional interests determine the social contract that is binding for the post-constitutional market game. However, following traditional preference subjectivism, it is left open what the constitutional interest are. Using the example of risk attitudes, we argue that this approach is too parsimonious with regard to the behavioral foundations to support a calculus of consent. In face of innovative activities with pecuniary and technological externalities in the post-constitutional phase, the citizens’ constitutional interests vary with their risk preferences. To determine what kind of social contract is generally agreeable, specific assumptions about risk preferences are needed.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group in its series Papers on Economics and Evolution with number 2008-03.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:esi:evopap:2008-03

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Related research
Keywords: constitutional preferences; social contract; original position; innovation; risk preferences Length 34 pages;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
O33 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61, pages 434. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Buchanan, James M, 1975. "A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(2), pages 225-30, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. James Buchanan, 2005. "Afraid to be free: Dependency as desideratum," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 19-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Buchanan, James M & Vanberg, Viktor J, 2002. " Constitutional Implications of Radical Subjectivism," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2-3), pages 121-29, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Witt, Ulrich, 1996. " Innovations, Externalities and the Problem of Economic Progress," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 89(1-2), pages 113-30, October.
  6. Rubin, Paul H & Paul, Chris W, II, 1979. "An Evolutionary Model of Taste for Risk," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(4), pages 585-96, October.
  7. Ulrich Witt, 2003. "Economic policy making in evolutionary perspective," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 77-94, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1996. "Exploiting the Coase Mechanism: The Extortion Problem," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(3), pages 319-30.
  9. Vanberg, Viktor J., 2005. "Market and state: the perspective of constitutional political economy," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(01), pages 23-49, June. [Downloadable!]
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