Toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract
AbstractThis paper delivers a step toward a naturalistic foundation of the social contract. While mainstream social contract theory is based on an original position model that is defined in an aprioristic way, we endogenize its key elements, i.e., develop them out of the individuals’ moral common sense. Therefore, the biological and social bases of moral intuitions are explored. In this context, a key adaptation during evolution was the one that enabled humans to understand conspecifics as intentional agents. Since these behavioral aspects are considered to be an exaptation, they are not amenable to direct genetic explanations or to rationality-based approaches. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866
Social contract theory; Fairness; Intentionality; Empathy; Human evolution; A13; B52; D63; D71; P16;
Other versions of this item:
- C. Cordes & C. Schubert, 2005. "Toward a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2005-01, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Viktor Vanberg, 1999. "Markets and Regulation: On the Contrast Between Free-Market Liberalism and Constitutional Liberalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 219-243, October.
- Rubin, Paul H., 1982. "Evolved ethics and efficient ethics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2-3), pages 161-174.
- Boyd, Robert & Richerson, Peter J., 1980. "Sociobiology, culture and economic theory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 97-121, June.
- Ferraro, Paul J. & Rondeau, Daniel & Poe, Gregory L., 2003. "Detecting other-regarding behavior with virtual players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 99-109, May.
- Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Breaking with the Notion of Social Contract: Constitutions as Based on Spontaneously Arisen Institutions," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 283-300, October.
- Selten, Reinhard, 1998.
"Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 413-436, May.
- Selten, Reinhard, . "Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality," Discussion Paper Serie B 421, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Nov 1997.
- Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Implicit Consitutional Change-Changing the Meaning of the Constitution Without Changing the Text of the Document," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 197-224, May.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1993.
"Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
- Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
- M. Rabin, 2001. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Levine's Working Paper Archive 511, David K. Levine.
- Bruno Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2004.
"Introducing Procedural Utility: Not Only What, but Also How Matters,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(3), pages 377-, September.
- Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, . "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not only What, but also How Matters," IEW - Working Papers 129, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Bruno S. Frey & Matthias Benz & Alois Stutzer, 2003. "Introducing Procedural Utility: Not only What, but also How Matters," CREMA Working Paper Series 2003-02, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Schlicht, Ekkehart, 1998. "On Custom in the Economy," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292241.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1955. "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63, pages 309.
- C. Cordes, 2004.
"The Human Adaptation for Culture and its Behavioral Implications,"
Papers on Economics and Evolution
2003-10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
- Christian Cordes, 2004. "The Human Adaptation for Culture and its Behavioral Implications," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 143-163, May.
- Viktor J. Vanberg, 2004. "The Status Quo in Contractarian-Constitutionalist Perspective," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 153-170, 06.
- John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61, pages 434.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.