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Appropriation, violent enforcement and transaction costs : a critical survey

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  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    (ERASME - Recherche et analyse des sociétés Maghreb-Europe - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis)

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the extension of transaction costs to appropriative activity and coercive power in the property rights approach. It has been argued that including the costs of appropriation and violent enforcement in transaction costs is based on the assumption that Coaseian bargaining can be extended to any institutional scenario, i.e., voluntary as well as coercive exchange. However, voluntary transactions cannot capture the logic of coercive power. This means that the assumption of an efficient political market is not valid, and that the "Political Coase Theorem" (PCT) lacks the logical consistency to provide a cornerstone for political theory.

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  • Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "Appropriation, violent enforcement and transaction costs : a critical survey," Post-Print hal-00629109, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00629109
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9721-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2011. "The Economics of Destructive Power," Chapters, in: Derek L. Braddon & Keith Hartley (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Conflict, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Vladan Holcner & Marek Sedlačik & Jaroslav Michálek & Jakub Odehnal, 2014. "Transaction Costs in International Armaments Cooperation," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(2), pages 217-232.
    3. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2020. "Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 233-242, March.
    4. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2012. "Political Economy of Conflict Foreword," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 122(2), pages 153-169.
    5. MacKenzie, Ian A. & Ohndorf, Markus, 2013. "Restricted Coasean bargaining," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 296-307.
    6. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2019. "A Review of Rent-seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality, The Top 20%, 2019 by Péter Mihályi and Iván Szelényi," Working Papers hal-02290741, HAL.
    7. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2016. "A positive theory of the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(3), pages 153-175, September.
    8. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2019. "A Review of Rent-seekers, Profits, Wages and Inequality, The Top 20%, 2019 by Peter Mihalyi and Ivan Szelenyi," CEPN Working Papers 2019-07, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
    9. Pietri, Antoine, 2015. "« Propriété » ou « possession » : une question de sémantique…ou de paradigme ? [“Property” or “possession”: just a matter of semantics…or paradigm?]," MPRA Paper 67096, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Steven G. Medema, 2020. "The Coase Theorem at Sixty," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1045-1128, December.
    11. Francesco Angelini & Guido Candela & Massimiliano Castellani, 2020. "Governance efficiency with and without government," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(1), pages 183-200, January.
    12. Vahabi, Mehrdad & Klebaner, Samuel, 2023. "Une nouvelle perspective sur la prédation, le conflit, le capitalisme et le changement institutionne (Une évaluation critique de l’école de régulation), entretien de Mehrdad Vahabi avec Samuel Klebane," MPRA Paper 119567, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2018. "The resource curse literature as seen through the appropriability lens: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 393-428, June.
    14. Antoine Pietri, 2017. "Les modèles de « rivalité coercitive » dans l’analyse économique des conflits," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(3), pages 307-352.
    15. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "Coercive state, resisting society, political and economic development in Iran," CEPN Working Papers 2017-17, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
    16. Ennio Piano, 2020. "Coase Goes to War: Contract Choice on the Battlefield," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 130(6), pages 1001-1023.
    17. Gert Tinggaard Svendsen, 2020. "Two bandits or more? The case of Viking Age England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 443-457, March.
    18. Ennio E. Piano, 2019. "State capacity and public choice: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 289-309, January.
    19. Peter J. Boettke & Rosolino A. Candela, 2020. "Productive specialization, peaceful cooperation and the problem of the predatory state: lessons from comparative historical political economy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 331-352, March.
    20. Luljeta Hajderllari & Kostas Karantininis & Lartey G. Lawson, 2012. "FDI as an Export-Platform: A Gravity Model for the Danish Agri-Food Industry," IFRO Working Paper 2012/7, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    21. Harris,Colin & Cai,Meina & Murtazashvili,Ilia & Murtazashvili,Jennifer Brick, 2020. "The Origins and Consequences of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108969055.
    22. Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2020. "Altruism, predation and the Samaritan's dilemma," Working Papers hal-02550432, HAL.
    23. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2011. "Soft budget constraint and the parastatal sector," MPRA Paper 37926, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Appropriation; Hobbesian state; Political Coase Theorem; Property rights approach; transaction costs; violent enforcement; Etat Hobbesien; théorème politique de Coase; approche en termes de droits de propriété; coûts de transaction; mise en œuvre violente;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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