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The Voracity Effect

Author

Listed:
  • Philip R. Lane
  • Aaron Tornell

Abstract

The authors analyze an economy that lacks a strong legal-political institutional infrastructure and is populated by multiple powerful groups. Powerful groups dynamically interact via a fiscal process that effectively allows open access to the aggregate capital stock. In equilibrium, this leads to slow economic growth and a 'voracity effect,' by which a shock, such as a terms of trade windfall, perversely generates a more-than-proportionate increase in fiscal redistribution and reduces growth. The authors also show that a dilution in the concentration of power leads to faster growth and a less procyclical response to shocks.

Suggested Citation

  • Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:89:y:1999:i:1:p:22-46
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.89.1.22
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barro, Robert J, 1996. "Institutions and Growth, an Introductory Essay," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 145-148, June.
    2. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies
    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models

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