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Recurrent High Inflation and Stabilization: A Dynamic Game

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Author Info
Mondino, Guillermo
Sturzenegger, Federico
Tommasi, Mariano

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Abstract

The authors analyze the dynamics of inflation that arise from fiscal deficits caused by the noncooperative behavior of interest groups. The 'state' variable is the degree of financial adaptation, a proxy for the share of wealth agents hold in alternatives to domestic currency. As financial adaptation becomes widespread, the costs of financing a given budget deficit rise. In this context, there can be fully rational cycles of increasing inflation and financial adaptation, followed by stabilization and remonetization. The model seems applicable to the experience of many Latin American countries. Copyright 1996 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 37 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 981-96
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:37:y:1996:i:4:p:981-96

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Pablo E. Guidotti & Carlos A. Végh, 1997. "Losing Credibility: The Stabilization Blues," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 122, Universidad del CEMA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Casella, Alessandra & Feinstein, Jonathan S, 1990. "Economic Exchange during Hyperinflation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 1-27, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Lucas, Robert Jr. & Stokey, Nancy L., 1983. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy in an economy without capital," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 55-93. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Thomas J. Sargent, 1981. "The ends of four big inflations," Working Papers 158, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
  5. Akerlof, George A, 1991. "Procrastination and Obedience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(2), pages 1-19, May.
  6. Dornbusch, Rudiger & Fischer, Stanley, 1991. "Moderate inflation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 807, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Michael Bruno, 1989. "Israel's Crisis and Economic Reform: A Historical Perspective," NBER Working Papers 3075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alesina, A. & Drazen, A., 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," Papers 6-91, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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  10. Federico Sturzenegger, 1992. "Inflation and Social Welfare in a Model With Endogenous Financial Adaptation," NBER Working Papers 4103, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Federico A. Sturzenegger, 1992. "Inflation and Social Welfare in a Model with Endogenous Financial Adaptation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 658, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  12. Tabellini, Guido, 1986. "Money, debt and deficits in a dynamic game," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 427-442, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Aizenman, Joshua, 1992. "Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seigniorage," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 24(1), pages 61-71, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thomas Sargent & Noah Williams & Tao Zha, 2006. "The conquest of South American inflation," Working Paper 2006-20, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Oscar J. Arce, 2006. "Speculative Hyperinflations: When Can We Rule Them Out?," Computing in Economics and Finance 2006 376, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Miguel Braun & Mariano Tommasi, 2004. "Fiscal Rules for Subnational Governments. Some organizing principles and Latin American experiences," Public Economics 0410004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sebastian M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 169-209, May. [Downloadable!]
  5. RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco J., 1997. "Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination," Cahiers de recherche 9712, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques. [Downloadable!]
  6. Stefania Albanesi, . "Inflation and Inequality," Working Papers 199, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Stefania Albanesi, 2002. "Inflation and Inequality," Macroeconomics 0201002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  8. Pranab Bardhan & Tsung-Tao Yang, 2004. "Political Competition in Economic Perspective," Development and Comp Systems 0407009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  9. Juliana Bambaci & Tamara Saront & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "The Political Economy of Economic Reforms in Argentina," Journal of Policy Reform, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 5(2), pages 75-88, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Óscar J. Arce, 2006. "Speculative hyperinflations: when can we rule them out?," Banco de España Working Papers 0607, Banco de España. [Downloadable!]
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