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The Economics of Central Banking

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Author Info
Cukierman, A.

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Abstract

Since 1989 twenty five countries in different parts of the world have substantially upgraded the legal independence of their central bank's. This trend is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that during the preceding forty years changes in central bank (CB) legislation were relatively rare. In parallel there has been a remarkable upsurge in both theoretical and empirical research on the meaning of central bank independence (CBI), its measurement, the interaction between government and the CB, the effect of CBI on the performance of the economy, the design of optimal contracts for central bankers, the functionning of nominal targets, and the deeper determinants of CBI. This paper is a broad survey of recent development in this rapidly growin area.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 36-96.

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Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 1996
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Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:36-96

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Related research
Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; ECONOMIC POLICY;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bruno, Michael & Easterly, William, 1998. "Inflation crises and long-run growth," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 3-26, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Joshua Aizenman, 1992. "The Competitive Externalities and the Optimal Seignorage," NBER Working Papers 2937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Eijffinger, S. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The Ultimate Determinants of Central Bank Independence," Discussion Paper 5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  5. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Herrendorf, Berthold, 1999. "Transparency, reputation, and credibility under floating and pegged exchange rates," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 31-50, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
    Other versions:
  9. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Gregory F. Udell & Paul Wachtel, 1994. "Financial System Design for Formerly Planned Economies: Defining the Issues," Working Papers 94-27, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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    Other versions:
  14. Devereux, Michael, 1987. "The effect of monetary variability on welfare in a simple macroeconomic model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 427-435, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Eijffinger, S. & De Hann, J., 1995. "The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence," Papers 9587, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  16. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Jose Vinals, 1994. "Strategy an tactics of monetary policy: examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 139-194. [Downloadable!]
  17. Logue, Dennis E & Willett, Thomas D, 1976. "A Note on the Relation between the Rate and Variability of Inflation," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 43(17), pages 151-58, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," CEPR Discussion Papers 518, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Charles Goodhart & José Viñals, 1994. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Banco de España Working Papers 9425, Banco de España.
  20. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    Other versions:
  21. Alex Cukierman, 1993. "Central Bank Independence, Political Influence and Macroeconomic Performance: a Survey of Recent Development," Cuadernos de Economía (Latin American Journal of Economics), Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 30(91), pages 271-292. [Downloadable!]
  22. Swank, Otto H, 1994. " Better Monetary Control May Increase the Inflationary Bias of Policy," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 96(1), pages 125-31.
  23. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Charles Goodhart & José Viñals, 1994. "Strategy and Tactics of Monetary Policy: Examples from Europe and the Antipodes," Banco de España Working Papers 9425, Banco de España.
  25. J. Bradford DeLong & Lawrence H. Summers, 1992. "Macroeconomic policy and long-run growth," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 93-148.
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  26. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Cukierman, Alex, 1994. "Central Bank Independence and Monetary Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 104(427), pages 1437-48, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Cukierman, Alex & Gerlach, Stefan, 2003. "The Inflation Bias Revisited: Theory and Some International Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 3761, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Gerali, Andrea & Lippi, Francesco, 2001. "On the 'Conquest' of Inflation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3101, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Berger, Helge & Woitek, Ulrich, 1999. "Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Cukierman, A. & Miller, G.P. & Neyapti, B., 2000. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies : an international perspective," Discussion Paper 106, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. M. Demertzis, 2001. "Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 72, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan, 1997. "A State within the State? An Event Study on the Bundesbank," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  7. Helmut Frisch & Sylvia Staudinger, 2002. "Comparing Different Central Bank Targets," Empirica, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 11-30, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Maria Demertzis, . "When can an Independent Central Bank offer lower Inflation at no Cost? A Political Economy Analysis," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Francesco Papadia & Gian Ruggiero, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-90, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. M. Demertzis, 2001. "Central Bank Independence: Low Inflation at no Cost? A Numeral Simulations Exercise," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 656, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Athanasios Papadopoulos & Giuseppe Diana & Moise Sidiropoulos, 2005. "Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 58, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
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