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The Economics of Central Banking

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  • Cukierman, A.

Abstract

Since 1989 twenty five countries in different parts of the world have substantially upgraded the legal independence of their central bank's. This trend is particularly remarkable in view of the fact that during the preceding forty years changes in central bank (CB) legislation were relatively rare. In parallel there has been a remarkable upsurge in both theoretical and empirical research on the meaning of central bank independence (CBI), its measurement, the interaction between government and the CB, the effect of CBI on the performance of the economy, the design of optimal contracts for central bankers, the functionning of nominal targets, and the deeper determinants of CBI. This paper is a broad survey of recent development in this rapidly growin area.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 36-96.

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Length: 55 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:36-96

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Postal: Israel TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY, THE FOERDER INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, RAMAT AVIV 69 978 TEL AVIV ISRAEL.
Phone: 972-3-640-9255
Fax: 972-3-640-5815
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Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/foerder.asp
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Keywords: CENTRAL BANKS; ECONOMIC POLICY;

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References

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  1. Dirk Schoenmaker, 1992. "Institutional Separation between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies," FMG Special Papers sp52, Financial Markets Group.
  2. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
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  7. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  8. Thomas Havrilesky & John Gildea, 1991. "Screening Fomc Members For Their Biases And Dependability," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 139-149, 07.
  9. Bennett T. McCallum, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central Bank Independence," NBER Working Papers 5075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Cukierman, A. & Webb, S., 1994. "Political Influence on the Central Bank : International Evidence," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1994-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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  26. Gregory F. Udell & Paul Wachtel, 1994. "Financial System Design for Formerly Planned Economies: Defining the Issues," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 94-27, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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  32. repec:fth:baesse:9425 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Mariusz Jarmuzek & Lucjan T. Orlowski & Artur Radziwill, 2004. "Monetary Policy Transparency in Inflation Targeting Countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland," CASE Network Studies and Analyses, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research 0281, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  2. Cukierman, Alex & Miller, Geoffrey P. & Neyapti, Bilin, 2002. "Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies--an international perspective," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 237-264, March.
  3. Andrea Gerali & Francesco Lippi, 2002. "On the 'conquest' of inflation," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area 444, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  4. Helmut Frisch & Sylvia Staudinger, 2002. "Comparing Different Central Bank Targets," Empirica, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 11-30, March.
  5. M. Demertzis, 2001. "Central Bank Independence: Low Inflation at no Cost? A Numeral Simulations Exercise," WO Research Memoranda (discontinued) 656, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  6. Alex Cukierman & Stefan Gerlach, 2003. "The inflation bias revisited: theory and some international evidence," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 71(5), pages 541-565, 09.
  7. Athanasios Papadopoulos & Giuseppe Diana & Moise Sidiropoulos, 2005. "Central Bank Reform and Inflation Dynamics in the Transition Economies theory and some evidence," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 58, Money Macro and Finance Research Group.
  8. Noha Farrag & Ahmed Kamaly, 2007. "Measuring the Degree of Central Bank Independence in Egypt," Working Papers, The German University in Cairo, Faculty of Management Technology 4, The German University in Cairo, Faculty of Management Technology.
  9. Francesco Papadia & Gian Ruggiero, 1999. "Central Bank Independence and Budget Constraints for a Stable Euro," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 63-90, February.
  10. Helge Berger & Ulrich Woitek, 1999. "Does Conservatism Matter? A Time Series Approach to Central Banking," CESifo Working Paper Series 190, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. M. Demertzis, 2001. "Low inflation at no cost? A numerical simulations exercise," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 72, Netherlands Central Bank.

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