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Central bank independence: A sensitivity analysis

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  • Eijffinger, Sylvester
  • Schaling, Eric
  • Hoeberichts, Marco

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 73-88

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:73-88

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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References

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  1. Eijffinger, S-C-W & de Haan, J, 1996. "The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence," Princeton Studies in International Economics, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University, 19, International Economics Section, Departement of Economics Princeton University,.
  2. J. Bradford DeLong & Lawrence H. Summers, 1992. "Macroeconomic policy and long-run growth," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q IV, pages 5-29.
  3. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M., 1998. "The trade off between central bank independence and conservativeness," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-76576, Tilburg University.
  4. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B, 1995. "Political Influence on the Central Bank: International Evidence," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 9(3), pages 397-423, September.
  5. Alex Cukierman, 1993. "Central Bank Independence, Political Influence and Macroeconomic Performance: a Survey of Recent Development," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 30(91), pages 271-292.
  6. David Romer, 1991. "Openness and inflation: theory and evidence," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Nov.
  7. Fischer, Stanley, 1977. "Wage indexation and macroeconomics stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 107-147, January.
  8. Robert J. Barro, 1989. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," NBER Working Papers 3120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Cukierman, Alex & Kalaitzidakis, Pantelis & Summers, Lawrence H. & Webb, Steven B., 1993. "Central bank independence, growth, investment, and real rates," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 95-140, December.
  10. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence: Theory and evidence (Revised version)," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1993-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Alesina, Alberto & Summers, Lawrence H, 1993. "Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 25(2), pages 151-62, May.
  13. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 10, December.
  14. Cukierman, Alex & Webb, Steven B & Neyapti, Bilin, 1992. "Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, World Bank Group, vol. 6(3), pages 353-98, September.
  15. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  16. Manfred Neumann, 1991. "Precommitment by central bank independence," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 95-112, June.
  17. Gray, Jo Anna, 1976. "Wage indexation: A macroeconomic approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 221-235, April.
  18. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March.
  19. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-152908, Tilburg University.
  20. Alberto Alesina, 1988. "Macroeconomics and Politics," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1988, Volume 3, pages 13-62 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  22. Alesina, Alberto & Gatti, Roberta, 1995. "Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 196-200, May.
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