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Central bank independence: A sensitivity analysis

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Author Info
Eijffinger, Sylvester
Schaling, Eric
Hoeberichts, Marco

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 14 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 73-88
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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:73-88

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  1. William G. Dewald, 1998. "Historical U.S. money growth, inflation, and inflation credibility," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov, pages 13-24. [Downloadable!]
  2. Jordahl, Henrik & Laséen, Stefan, 1999. "Central Bank Conservatism and Labor Market Reform," Working Paper Series 1999:23, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Jan Libich, 2007. "Fiscal-monetary Interactions: The Effect of Fiscal Restraint and Public Monitoring on Central Bank Credibility," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(5), pages 559-576, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & Hellström, Jörgen & Landström, Mats, 2009. "Why Do Politicians Implement Central Bank Independence Reforms?," Ratio Working Papers 143, The Ratio Institute. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Andrew Hughes Hallett & Maria Demertzis, . "When can an Independent Central Bank offer lower Inflation at no Cost? A Political Economy Analysis," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. David Cobham & Stefania Cosci & Fabrizio Mattesini, 2008. "Informal central bank independence: an analysis for three European countries," CEIS Research Paper 116, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 14 Jul 2008. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Luis Jácome & Francisco Vázquez, 2005. "Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean," Macroeconomics 0508011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Herrendorf, B. & Neumann, M.J.M., 1998. "A non-Normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 515, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Ivo J.M. Arnold & Casper G. de Vries, 1999. "Endogenous Financial Structure and the Transmission of ECB Policy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 99-021/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  10. Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov & de Luna, Xavier, 2002. "Central Bank Independence and Price Stability: Evidence from 23 OECD-countries," UmeÃ¥ Economic Studies 589, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 12 Jun 2003. [Downloadable!]
  11. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred Neumann, 2000. "A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 136(2), pages 315-333, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2007. "Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 55-69, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jan Libich, 2006. "An Explicit Inflation Target As A Commitment Device," CAMA Working Papers 2006-22, Australian National University, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis. [Downloadable!]
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