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Is New Zealand's Reserve Bank Act of 1989 an Optimal Central Bank Contract?

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  • Walsh, Carl E

Abstract

This paper evaluates the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act of 1989 from a principal-agent perspective, arguing that the act represents a dismissal rule. The optimal dismissal rule requires that the central banker be dismissed whenever inflation exceeds a critical level that depends on aggregate supply disturbances and measurement error in the inflation index. This is essentially the structure established by the act. The scope for renegotiating the target rate, however, creates an incentive for the government to set the critical rate too high. Consequently, the inflation bias of discretion is reduced but not completely eliminated. Copyright 1995 by Ohio State University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 27 (1995)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 1179-91

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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:27:y:1995:i:4:p:1179-91

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

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References

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  1. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  2. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  3. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jurgen & Waller, Christopher J, 1997. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(2), pages 378-93, April.
  4. Andreas Fischer, 1993. "Inflation Targeting: The New Zealand and Canadian Cases," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, Spring/Su.
  5. Duca, John V, 1987. "The Spillover Effects of Nominal Wage Rigidity in a Multisector Economy: A Note," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(1), pages 117-21, February.
  6. Waller, Christopher J, 1992. "The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-12, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2010. "Why EMU is not a failure," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-11, March.
  2. Guender, Alfred V. & Lees, Kirdan, 1999. "Optimal Revenue Smoothing: The Case of New Zealand," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 597-617, July.
  3. Lars E.O. Svensson, 1997. "Optimal Inflation Targets, `Conservative' Central Banks, and Linear Inflation Contracts," NBER Working Papers 5251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Richard T. Freeman & Jonathan L. Willis, 1995. "Targeting inflation in the 1990s: recent challenges," International Finance Discussion Papers 525, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Ammer, John & Freeman, Richard T., 1995. "Inflation targeting in the 1990s: The experiences of New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 165-192, May.
  6. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Destabilizing effects of exchange-rate escape clauses," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 61-77, August.
  7. Jonsson, Gunnar, 1997. "Monetary politics and unemployment persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 303-325, July.
  8. WenShwo Fang & Stephen M. Miller & ChunShen Lee, 2009. "Short- and Long-Run Differences in the Treatment Effects of Inflation Targeting on Developed and Developing Countries," Working Papers 1003, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics, revised Aug 2010.
  9. Leybourne, Stephen J. & Mizen, Paul, 1999. "Understanding the disinflations in Australia, Canada and New Zealand using evidence from smooth transition analysis," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(5), pages 799-816, October.
  10. Francisco Rosende, 1997. "La Autonomía del Banco Central una Vez Más," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 34(101), pages 3-26.
  11. Mayes, David G. & Razzak, W. A., 1998. "Transparency and accountability: Empirical models and policy making at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 377-394, July.
  12. WenShwo Fang & Stephen M. Miller & ChunShen Lee, 2009. "Inflation Targeting Evaluation: Short-run Costs and Long-run Irrelevance," Working Papers 0920, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics.
  13. Hayo, Bernd & Hefeker, Carsten, 2002. "Reconsidering central bank independence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 653-674, November.
  14. John V. Duca & David D. VanHoose, 1998. "The rise of goods-market competition and the fall of nominal wage contracting: endogenous wage contracting in a multisector economy," Working Papers 9805, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
  15. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Bovenberg, A. Lans, 2003. "Strategic debt accumulation in a heterogeneous monetary union," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-15, March.
  16. Peter J Stemp, 1997. "The Australian Government's Current Approach to Monetary Policy: An Evaluation," RBA Annual Conference Volume, in: Philip Lowe (ed.), Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting Reserve Bank of Australia.

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