This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Die Deregulierung der Zentralbanken: Auf zu einem internationalen Markt für gute Geldpolitik!

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Reiner Eichenberger
Sergio Rossi

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The effectiveness of a central bank's monetary policy depends on the incentives of its head and board members to pursue an efficient policy in the citizens interest. Today, however, these incentives are weakened by three kinds of regulations. First, in almost all countries, only nationals may be elected as head or board members. Secondly, only individuals may be appointed to such offices, but not monetary policy firms or political parties. Thirdly, the compensations for central bank governors and board members are regulated by law. In general, these compensations are far below the amount potential candidates may earn in the private sector. This paper proposes to abolish these regulations. This enables monetary policy suppliers to become active in several countries and currency areas, to gain an international reputation for pursuing credible, stability-oriented monetary policies, and to cater for the interests of the citizens. Thus, an international market for good monetary policy could arise, allowing countries to import stability-oriented policy makers, thus benefiting the general public and, in particular, the weakly-organized social groups.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sjes.ch/papers/2004-III-3.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES) in its journal Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics.

Volume (Year): 140 (2004)
Issue (Month): III (September)
Pages: 327-353
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ses:arsjes:2004-iii-3

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.sjes.ch
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Peter Steiner).

Related research
Keywords: monetary policy; deregulation; open markets; protectionism;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Fratianni, Michele & von Hagen, Jürgen & Waller, Christopher, 1993. "Central Banking as a Political Principal-Agent Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 752, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Rudiger Dornbusch & Carlo A. Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "The Immediate Challenges for the European Central Bank," NBER Working Papers 6369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Helge Berger & Jakob Haan, 2002. "Are small countries too powerful within the ECB?," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(3), pages 263-282, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Barry Eichengreen & Tamim Bayoumi, 1996. "Is Asia an Optimum Currency Area? Can It Become One? Regional, Global and Historical Perspectives on Asian Monetary Relations," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series 1033, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Manfred Gärtner, 1997. "Central Bank Independence and the Sacrifice Ratio: The Dark Side of the Force," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 133(III), pages 513-538, September. [Downloadable!]
  8. Rossi, Sergio, 2004. "The enlargement of the euro area: what lessons can be learned from EMU?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 947-970, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Lohmann, Susanne, 1992. "Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 273-86, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Bennett, Adam, 1994. "Currency Boards: Issues and Experiences," IMF Papers on Policy Analysis and Assessments 94/18, International Monetary Fund.
  12. Ball, Laurence, 1995. "Time-consistent policy and persistent changes in inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 329-350, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  13. Ernst Baltensperger & Peter Kugler, 2000. "Central Bank Independence and Sacrifice Ratios: Some Further Considerations," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 111-125, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Walsh, Carl E, 2000. "Market Discipline and Monetary Policy," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 52(2), pages 249-71, April.
  15. Waller, Christopher J, 1992. "The Choice of a Conservative Central Banker in a Multisector Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1006-12, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Frederic S. Mishkin, 2001. "Financial Policies and the Prevention of Financial Crises in Emerging Market Countries," NBER Working Papers 8087, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Adam Bennett, 1994. "Currency Boards: Issues and Experiences," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 94/18, International Monetary Fund.
  18. Klein, Benjamin, 1974. "The Competitive Supply of Money," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 6(4), pages 423-53, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Muscatelli, Anton, 1998. "Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability through Independence?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 529-42, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 195-225. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Anne Marie Gulde & Juha Kähkönen & Peter Keller, 2000. "Pros and Cons of Currency Board Arrangements in the Lead-Up to EU Accession and Participation in the Euro Zone," IMF Policy Discussion Papers 00/1, International Monetary Fund.
  22. Jordan, Thomas J., 1999. "Central bank independence and the sacrifice ratio," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 229-255, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Jochem, Axel & Herrmann, Sabine, 2003. "The international integration of money markets in the central and east European accession countries : deviations from covered interest parity, capital controls and inefficiencies in the financial sect," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2003,07, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre. [Downloadable!]
  24. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1993. "Designing institutions for monetary stability," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 53-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Gaetano Antinolfi & Todd Keister, 2001. "Dollarization as a monetary arrangement for emerging market economies," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Nov., pages 29-40. [Downloadable!]
  27. George A. Selgin & Lawrence H. White, 1994. "How Would the Invisible Hand Handle Money?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 32(4), pages 1718-1749, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  28. Massimo Sbracia & Andrea Zaghini, 2001. "The Role of the Banking System in the International Transmission of Shocks," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 409, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  29. Ellen E. Meade & D. Nathan Sheets, 2002. "Regional influences on U.S. monetary policy: some implications for Europe," International Finance Discussion Papers 721, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  30. Rudi Dornbusch & Carlo Favero & Francesco Giavazzi, 1998. "Immediate challenges for the European Central Bank," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 15-64, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by encouraging others to register as authors.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.