Svensson, Lars E.O. () (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University) Faust, John () (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
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We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in the sense that it induces higher inflation, but a less expansionary policy in the sense that it induces lower inflation and employment than expected. Increased transparency makes the bank's reputation and credibility more sensitive to its actions. This has a moderating influence on the bank's policy. Full transparency of the central bank's intentions is generally socially beneficial, but frequently not in the interest of the bank. Somewhat paradoxically, direct observability of idiosyncratic central bank goals removes the moderating incentive on the bank and leads to the worst equilibrium.
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Paper provided by Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies in its series Seminar Papers with number
636.
Length: 40 pages Date of creation: 26 Feb 1998 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0636
Contact details of provider: Postal: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden Phone: +46-8-162000 Fax: +46-8-161443 Web page: http://www.iies.su.se/ More information through EDIRC
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Find related papers by JEL classification: E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
N. Gregory Mankiw, 1994.
"Monetary Policy,"
NBER Books,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number greg94-1, September.
Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985.
"Inflation and Reputation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-38, June.
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