Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views

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Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views

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Jon Faust

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Jon Faust

Abstract

The Federal Reserve Act erected a unique structure of government decisionmaking, independent with elaborate rules balancing internal power. Historical evidence suggests that this outcome was a response to public conflict over inflation's redistributive powers. This paper documents and formalizes this argument: in the face of conflict over redistributive inflation, policy by majority can lead to policy that is worse, even for the majority, than obvious alternatives. The bargaining solution of an independent board with properly balanced interests leads to a better outcome. Technically, this paper extends earlier work in making policy preferences fully endogenous and in extending the notion of equilibrium policy to such a world. Substantively, this work provides a simple grounding of policy preferences--largely missing heretofore--linking game theoretic models of policy to historical evidence about the formation of an independent monetary authority.

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Paper provided by Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) in its series International Finance Discussion Papers with number 429.

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Date of creation: 1992
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:429

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References listed on IDEAS
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Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
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Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "Domestic politics and the international coordination of fiscal policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3-4), pages 245-265, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Tabellini, Guido, 1988. "Domestic Politics and the International Coordination of Fiscal Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 226, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Havrilesky, Thomas M, 1987. "A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 308-25, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and credibility: monetary policy with unobservable goals," International Finance Discussion Papers 605, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Faust, J. & Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Papers 636, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," CEPR Discussion Papers 1852, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Svensson, Lars E.O. & Faust, John, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," Seminar Papers 636, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-97, May.
Lars E.O. Svensson, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule," NBER Working Papers 6790, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Svensson, Lars E.O., 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule," Seminar Papers 646, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies. [Downloadable!]
- Svensson, L.E.O., 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule," Papers 646, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Svensson, Lars E O, 1998. "Inflation Targeting as a Monetary Policy Rule," CEPR Discussion Papers 1998, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
- Svensson, Lars E. O., 1999. "Inflation targeting as a monetary policy rule," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 607-654, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Herrendorf, B. & Neumann, M.J.M., 1998. "A non-Normative Theory of Inflation and Central Bank Independence," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 515, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred Neumann, 2000. "A nonnormative theory of inflation and central bank independence," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 136(2), pages 315-333, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Allan Drazen, 2002. "Central Bank Independence, Democracy, and Dollarization," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 1-17, May. [Downloadable!]
Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2004. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2004 85, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Corinne Aaron-Cureau & Hubert Kempf, 2006. "Bargaining over monetary policy in a monetary union and the case for appointing an independent central banker," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-27, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alan Blinder, 2006. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?," DNB Working Papers 092, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alan S. Blinder, 2005. "Monetary Policy by Committee: Why and How?," Working Papers 84, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies.. [Downloadable!]
- Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alessandra Casella, 2000. "Games for Central Bankers: Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions," NBER Working Papers 8026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Casella, A., 2000. "Games for Central Bankers, Markets v/s Politics in Public Policy Decisions," G.R.E.Q.A.M. 00a02, Universite Aix-Marseille III.
- Casella, Alessandra, 2000. "Games for Central Bankers: Markets vs. Politics in Public Policy Decisions," CEPR Discussion Papers 2496, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Stefania Albanesi, 2002. "The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents," Macroeconomics 0201003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Christopher J. Waller, 1998. "Appointing the median voter of a policy board," Working Paper 9802, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
Debora Di Gioacchino & Sergio Ginebri & Laura Sabani, 2004. "Political support for anti-inflationary monetary policy," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(2), pages 187-200. [Downloadable!]
Stefania Albanesi, . "The Time Consistency of Optimal Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers 207, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
Blinder, Alan S, 1997. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: What Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics--And Vice Versa," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 3-19, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Berthold Herrendorf & Manfred J.M. Neumann, 2003. "The Political Economy of Inflation, Labour Market Distortions and Central Bank Independence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(484), pages 43-64, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
James Bullard & Christopher J. Waller, 2002. "Central bank design in general equilibrium," Working Papers 1998-002, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bullard, James & Waller, Christopher J, 2004. "Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(1), pages 95-113, February.
Prakash Loungani & Nathan Sheets, 1995. "Central bank independence, inflation and growth in transition economies," International Finance Discussion Papers 519, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Loungani, Prakash & Sheets, Nathan, 1997. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in Transition Economies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(3), pages 381-99, August.

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