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Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: What Central Bankers Could Learn from Academics--And Vice Versa

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Blinder, Alan S

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Abstract

Academic writing about monetary policy has been useful to practical central bankers, but more of (certain aspects of) the economists' way of thinking could profitably be imported. On the other hand, academics could improve their analysis, and make it more useful to policymakers, if they would pay more attention to certain 'real-world' aspects of monetary policy. The author draws on his experience at the Federal Reserve Board to point out a number of specific lessons for each side. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.

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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal Journal of Economic Perspectives.

Volume (Year): 11 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (Spring)
Pages: 3-19
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Handle: RePEc:aea:jecper:v:11:y:1997:i:2:p:3-19

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  2. Faust, Jon, 1996. "Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Gordon, Robert J, 1997. "The Time-Varying NAIRU and Its Implications for Economic Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(1), pages 11-32, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Barro, Robert J., 1986. "Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 3-20, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. John Y. Campbell, 1995. "Some Lessons from the Yield Curve," NBER Working Papers 5031, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bernanke, Ben S & Woodford, Michael, 1997. "Inflation Forecasts and Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 29(4), pages 653-84, November.
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  7. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Athanasios Orphanides & David W. Wilcox, 1996. "The opportunistic approach to disinflation," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-24, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, 1996. "Federal Reserve Private Information and the Behavior of Interest Rates," NBER Working Papers 5692, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Martin Feldstein, 1997. "The Costs and Benefits of Going from Low Inflation to Price Stability," NBER Working Papers 5469, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Wage and public expenditure setting in a monetary union," Macroeconomics 0105002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Alexei Onatski & Noah Williams, 2002. "Modeling model uncertainty," Working Paper Series 169, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Allan M. Malz, 1998. "Interbank interest rates as term structure indicators," Research Paper 9803, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  4. Paolo Surico, 2004. "Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: the Case of Asymmetric Preferences," Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 108, Society for Computational Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Richard Mash, 2000. "The Time Inconsistency of Monetary Policy with Inflation Persistence," Economics Series Working Papers 015, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. W. Douglas McMillin & James S. Fackler, . "Evaluating Monetary Policy Options," Departmental Working Papers 2001-09, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Peter N. Ireland, 2002. ""Rules Rather Than Discretion" After Twenty Five Years: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 530, Boston College Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Don H. Kim & Athanasios Orphanides, 2005. "Term structure estimation with survey data on interest rate forecasts," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-48, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
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  9. George Furstenberg, 1998. "From Worldwide Capital Mobility to International Financial Integration: A Review Essay," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 53-84, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Minford, Patrick & Srinivasan, Naveen, 2008. "Are Central Bank Preferences Asymmetric? A Comment," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2008/5, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Edward Nelson, 2007. "Milton Friedman and U.S. monetary history: 1961-2006," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 153-182. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Doyle, Matthew & Falk, Barry L., 2006. "Do Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences Help Explain Observed Inflation Outcomes?," Staff General Research Papers 12501, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  13. L. Lambertini & R. Rovelli, 2003. "Monetary and fiscal policy coordination and macroeconomic stabilization. A theoretical analysis," Working Papers 464, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  14. Carlos Hamilton Vasconcelos Araujo & Marta Baltar Moreira Areosa & Osmani Teixera de Carvalho Guillén, 2004. "Estimating Potential Output And The Output Gap For Brazil," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 041, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
  15. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union," Macroeconomics 0106003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  16. J. Fackler & L. Filer, 2004. "Exchange Rate Targeting and Economic Stabilization," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 565, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  17. Paolo Surico, 2002. "Uncovering Policy Makers' Loss Function," Macroeconomics 0210003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  18. Richard Mash, 2002. "Monetary Policy with an Endogenous Capital Stock when Inflation is Persistent," Economics Series Working Papers 108, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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