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Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

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Author Info
RUGE-MURCIA, Francisco .J.

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Abstract

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

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Paper provided by Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 2001-04.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 2001
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Handle: RePEc:mtl:montde:2001-04

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Keywords: inflation targets asymmetric eferences credibility

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kilian, Lutz & Manganelli, Simone, 2007. "The Central Banker as a Risk Manager: Estimating the Federal Reserve's Preferences under Greenspan," CEPR Discussion Papers 6031, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Katrin Wesche, 2003. "Monetary Policy in Europe: Evidence from Time-Varying Taylor Rules," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse21_2003, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Tambakis, D.N., 2007. "Fear of Floating and Social Welfare," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0726, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Helge Berger & Jakob de Haan & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2006. "Does Money Matter in the ECB Strategy? New Evidence Based on ECB Communication," Working papers 06-125, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Paolo Surico, 2004. "Inflation Targeting and Nonlinear Policy Rules: The Case of Asymmetric Preferences," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo GmbH. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Stefan Krause & Fabio Mendez, 2006. "Does Opportunism Pay Off? A Study of Vote Functions and Policy Preferences," Emory Economics 0604, Department of Economics, Emory University (Atlanta). [Downloadable!]
  7. David Andolfatto & Scott Hendry & Kevin Moran, 2004. "Inflation Expectations and Learning about Monetary Policy," DNB Staff Reports (discontinued) 121, Netherlands Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Efrem Castelnuovo, 2002. "Squeezing the Interest Rate Smoothing Weight with a Hybrid Expectations Model," Macroeconomics 0211006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Carl E. Walsh, 2002. "Are contemporary central banks transparent about economic models and objectives and what difference does it make? - commentary," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 37-46. [Downloadable!]
  10. David Andolfatto & Scott Hendry & Kevin Moran, 2005. "Are Inflation Expectations Rational?," Macroeconomics 0501002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Özer Karagedikli & Kirdan Lees, 2004. "Do inflation targeting central banks behave asymmetrically? Evidence from Australia and New Zealand," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series DP 2004/02, Reserve Bank of New Zealand. [Downloadable!]
  12. Manuel M F Martins & Alvaro Aguiar, 2005. "Testing for Asymmetries in the Preferences of the Euro-Area Monetary Policymaker," Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference 2005 41, Money Macro and Finance Research Group. [Downloadable!]
  13. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "Monetary Policy and Real Stabilization," NBER Working Papers 9486, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Carlos Carmona, 2005. "Bias in Federal Reserve Inflation Forecasts: Is the Federal Reserve Irrational or Just Cautious?," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2005-05, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  15. Nicholas Apergis & Stephen M. Miller & Alexandros Panethimitakis & Athanassios Vamvakidis, 2005. "Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Evidence from Aggregate European Data," Working papers 2005-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Doyle, Matthew & Falk, Barry L., 2006. "Do Asymmetric Central Bank Preferences Help Explain Observed Inflation Outcomes?," Staff General Research Papers 12501, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Pierre St-Amant & David Tessier, 2000. "Résultats empiriques multi-pays relatifs à l'impact des cibles d'inflation sur la crédibilité de la politique monétaire," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 26(3), pages 295-310, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Vítor Castro, 2008. "Are Central Banks following a linear or nonlinear (augmented) Taylor rule?," NIPE Working Papers 19/2008, NIPE - Universidade do Minho. [Downloadable!]
  19. Nicholas Apergis & Stephen M. Miller & Alexandros Panethimitakis & Athanasios Vamvakidis, 2005. "Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Empirical Evidence for the European Union," IMF Working Papers 05/89, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  20. Bunzel, Helle & Enders, Walter, 2005. "Is the Taylor Rule Missing? A Statistical Investigation," Staff General Research Papers 12301, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  21. Lars Svensson, 2006. "Optimal Inflation Targeting: Further Developments of Inflation Targeting," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 403, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
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