Keiichi Morimoto () (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University)
Abstract
This paper explores an optimal personnel organization problem of monetary policy committees. First, I construct an analytically tractable model for monetary policy analysis which starts from decision-making in the monetary policy committee. Using the model, I investigate the relationship between preference heterogeneity among the committee members and the optimal structure of the monetary policy committee. The result shows that it is optimal in general cases to appoint not only inflation-minded (hawkish) persons but also output-minded (dovish) persons. This is a justification for the fact that the actual monetary policy committees (e.g. MPC of Bank of England and FOMC) usually consist of both type members as the empirical researches suggest.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number
09-36.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
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