This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
Appointing the median voter of a policy board Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Christopher J. Waller
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
A description of a model which demonstrates that delegating monetary policy to an independent policy board with discretionary powers substantially reduces policy uncertainty while maintaining political accountability.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number
9802.
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
plain text ,
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 1998Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9802Contact details of provider: Postal: 1455 East 6th St., Cleveland OH 44114 Phone: 216.579.2000 Web page: http://www.clevelandfed.org/ More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Email:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Diane Rosenberger).
Keywords: Business cycles Economic policy References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Svensson, Lars E O, 1995.
"The Swedish Experience of an Inflation Target ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1103, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Lohmann, Susanne, 1997.
"Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers ,"
European Journal of Political Economy ,
Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cothren, Richard, 1988.
"Equilibrium Inflation as Determined by a Policy Committee ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 103(2), pages 429-34, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jon Faust, 1992.
"Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views ,"
International Finance Discussion Papers
429, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
Faust, Jon, 1996.
"Whom can we trust to run the Fed? Theoretical support for the founders' views ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 267-283, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986.
"A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Waller, Christopher J & Walsh, Carl E, 1996.
"Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 86(5), pages 1139-53, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Waller, Christopher J., 1992.
"A bargaining model of partisan appointments to the central bank ,"
Journal of Monetary Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 411-428, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Tabellini, Guido, 1987.
"Reputational constraints on monetary policy a comment ,"
Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy ,
Elsevier, vol. 26, pages 183-190.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alesina, Alberto, 1987.
"Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 651-78, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996.
"A Theory of Divided Government ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-41, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Snyder, Susan K & Weingast, Barry R, 2000.
"The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 269-305, October.
Full
references
Access and
download statistics Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.
This page was last updated on 2008-7-23.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .