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Reputational constraints on monetary policy

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Author Info
Rogoff, Kenneth
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.

Volume (Year): 26 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 141-181
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Handle: RePEc:eee:crcspp:v:26:y:1987:i::p:141-181

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