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Domestic Politics and the International Coordination of Fiscal Policies Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Tabellini, Guido
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This paper investigates the desirability of international fiscal policy coordination in the presence of a domestic political distortion. The domestic distortion results from the inability of the current policy-maker to enter into a binding agreement with future policy-makers about the composition of public spending. This distortion generates a bias towards budget deficits. International coordination can exacerbate this bias, and thus reduce social welfare at home and abroad. The reason is that international coordination enables the domestic and foreign governments to form a coalition that excludes future policy-makers. This international coalition reduces the cost of running a budget deficit, and thus enhances the adverse effects of the domestic political distortion.
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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number
226.
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Date of creation: Feb 1988Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:226Contact details of provider: Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801 Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
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Keywords: Budget Deficit ; Coordination ; Fiscal Policy ; International Policy ; Political Economy ; Public Spending ; Other versions of this item:
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Rui Henrique Alves & Óscar Afonso, 2006.
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"Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn? ,"
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