Delegating Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia
AbstractThis paper shows that absent a commitment technology, central banks can nevertheless achieve the (timeless-)optimal commitment equilibrium if they are delegated with an objective function that is different from the societal one. In a prototypical forward-looking New Keynesian model, I develop a general linear-quadratic method to solve for the optimal delegation parameters that generate the optimal amount of inertia in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. I study the optimal design of some policy regimes that are nested within this framework: inflation, output-gap growth and nominal income growth targeting; and inflation and output-gap contracts. Notably, since the timeless-optimal equilibrium is time-consistent, so is any delegation scheme that implements it.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 7482.
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-11-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2009-11-27 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2009-11-27 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2009-11-27 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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