The paper contains a theoretical discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy. It documents the Federal Reserve's defense of secrecy as argued in a recent Freedom of Information Act suit. The Federal Reserve's arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory. Theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed. The discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central bank secrecy, and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial.
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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number
85-07.
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repec:fip:fedreq:y:1982:i:jan/feb:p:3-16:n:v.68no.1 is not listed on IDEAS
Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985.
"Inflation and Reputation,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-38, June.
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