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Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking

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  • Marvin Goodfriend

Abstract

The paper contains a theoretical discussion of the role of secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy. It documents the Federal Reserve's defense of secrecy as argued in a recent Freedom of Information Act suit. The Federal Reserve's arguments are evaluated on the basis of economic theory. Theoretical papers related to the secrecy issue are reviewed. The discussion highlights a number of potential benefits and costs of central banking secrecy, and identifies some conditions under which secrecy could be socially beneficial.

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File URL: http://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/working_papers/1985/wp_85-7.cfm
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in its series Working Paper with number 85-07.

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Date of creation: 1985
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedrwp:85-07

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Related research

Keywords: Monetary policy ; Banks and banking; Central;

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References

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  1. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  2. Cornell, Bradford, 1983. "The Money Supply Announcements Puzzle: Review and Interpretation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 644-57, September.
  3. Barro, Robert J., 1976. "Rational expectations and the role of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 1-32, January.
  4. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
  5. Sanford J Grossman & Joseph E Stiglitz, 1997. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1908, David K. Levine.
  6. Gould, John P & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1985. "The Information Content of Specialist Pricing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(1), pages 66-83, February.
  7. Michael Dotsey, 1985. "Monetary policy, secrecy, and federal funds rate behavior," Working Paper 85-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  8. D. Backus & J. Driffil, 1998. "Inflation and Reputation," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625, David K. Levine.
  9. Marvin Goodfriend, 1982. "A model of money stock determination with loan demand and a banking system balance sheet constraint," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Jan, pages 3-16.
  10. Acheson, Keith & Chant, John F, 1973. "Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 5(2), pages 637-55, May.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. The Mystique of the Clique
    by Agent Continuum in Agent Continuum on 2010-01-11 16:56:29
  2. 'A Century of U.S. Central Banking: Goals, Frameworks, Accountability'
    by Mark Thoma in Economist's View on 2013-07-10 13:48:26
  3. Here Are The Challenges For Monetary Policy Communication
    by Jeremy Stein, Board Of Governors Of The Federal Reserve System in Business Insider on 2014-05-06 23:09:00
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