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Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model

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  • Chan G. Huh
  • Kevin J. Lansing

Abstract

A study of the effects of expectations and central bank credibility on the economy's dynamic transition path during a disinflation. Using a version of the Fuhrer-Moore model, it compares simulations under different specifications that vary according to the way expectations are formed and the degree of central bank credibility.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 9713.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9713

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Keywords: Monetary policy ; Inflation (Finance) ; Business cycles;

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References

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