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Federal Reserve credibility and inflation scares

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  • Chan Guk Huh
  • Kevin J. Lansing

Abstract

We develop a simple, quantitative model of the U.S. economy to demonstrate how an \"inflation scare \" may occur when the Federal Reserve lacks full credibility. In particular, we show that the long-term nominal interest rate may undergo a sudden increase if an adverse movement in the inflation rate triggers a deterioration in the public's beliefs about the Federal Reserve's commitment to maintaining low inflation in the future. We find that simulations from our model capture some observed patterns of U.S. interest rates in the 1980s.

Suggested Citation

  • Chan Guk Huh & Kevin J. Lansing, 1998. "Federal Reserve credibility and inflation scares," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, pages 3-16.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfer:y:1998:p:3-16:n:2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lansing, Kevin J. & Trehan, Bharat, 2003. "Forward-looking behavior and optimal discretionary monetary policy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 249-256, November.
    2. Huh, Chan G. & Lansing, Kevin J., 2000. "Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 52(1-2), pages 51-86.
    3. David Beckworth & Kenneth P. Moon & J. Holland Toles, 2012. "Can Monetary Policy Influence Long-Term Interest Rates? It Depends," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(4), pages 1080-1096, October.
    4. Michael J. Dueker, 1999. "Measuring monetary policy inertia in target Fed funds rate changes," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 81(Sep), pages 3-10.

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