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Opportunistic and deliberate disinflation under imperfect credibility

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  • Antulio N. Bomfim
  • Glenn D. Rudebusch

Abstract

On strategy for disinflation prescribes a deliberate path towards low inflation. A contrasting opportunistic approach eschews deliberate action and instead waits for unforeseen shocks to reduce inflation. This paper compares the ability of these two approaches to achieve disinflation-and at what cost. We analyze these issues using the Federal Reserve's FRB/US model, which allows alternative assumptions to be made about expectations held by agents in the economy; hence, the credibility of the central bank can be considered in assessing the cost of deliberate and opportunistic disinflation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco in its series Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory with number 97-07.

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Date of creation: 1997
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedfap:97-07

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Keywords: Inflation (Finance) ; Monetary policy ; Banks and banking; Central ; Monetary policy - United States;

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References

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  1. Thomas J. Sargent, 1978. "Estimation of dynamic labor demand schedules under rational expectations," Staff Report 27, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  2. Aksoy, Yunus & Orphanides, Athanasios & Small, David & Wieland, Volker & Wilcox, David, 2006. "A quantitative exploration of the opportunistic approach to disinflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(8), pages 1877-1893, November.
  3. Jeff Fuhrer & George Moore, 1993. "Inflation persistence," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 93-17, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  4. Taylor, John B., 1993. "Discretion versus policy rules in practice," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 195-214, December.
  5. Laurence Ball, 1993. "What Determines the Sacrifice Ratio?," NBER Working Papers 4306, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Glenn D. Rudebusch & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Policy rules for inflation targeting," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Mar.
  7. Shiller, Robert J, 1979. "The Volatility of Long-Term Interest Rates and Expectations Models of the Term Structure," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1190-1219, December.
  8. Chan G. Huh & Kevin J. Lansing, 1997. "Expectations, credibility, and disinflation in a small macroeconomic model," Working Paper 9713, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  9. Sharon Kozicki & P.A. Tinsley, 1997. "Moving endpoints and the internal consistency of agents' ex ante forecasts," Research Working Paper 97-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  10. King, Mervyn, 1995. "Credibility and Monetary Policy: Theory and Evidence," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 42(1), pages 1-19, February.
  11. F. Brayton & P. Tinsley, 1996. "A guide to FRB/US: a macroeconomic model of the United States," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-42, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  12. Rotemberg, Julio J, 1982. "Sticky Prices in the United States," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(6), pages 1187-1211, December.
  13. Jeffrey C. Fuhrer & Mark A. Hooker, 1988. "Learning about monetary regime shifts in an overlapping wage contract model," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 25, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  14. Flint Brayton & Eileen Mauskopf & David Reifschneider & Peter Tinsley & John Williams, 1997. "The role of expectations in the FRB/US macroeconomic model," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Apr, pages 227-245.
  15. Antulio Bomfim & Robert Tetlow & Peter Von Zur Muehlen & John Williams, 1997. "Expectations, learning and the costs of disinflation: experiments using the FRB/US model," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-42, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  16. Orphanides, Athanasios & Wilcox, David W, 2002. "The Opportunistic Approach to Disinflation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 47-71, Spring.
  17. Dean Croushore & Ronald S. Koot, 1991. "A measure of Federal Reserve credibility," Working Papers 91-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
  18. Robert Amano & Paul Fenton & David Tessier & Simon van Norden, 1996. "The credibility of monetary policy: a survey of the literature with some simple applications to Caanda," Meeting papers 9610001, EconWPA.
  19. P.A. Tinsley, 1993. "Fitting both data and theories: polynomial adjustment costs and error- correction decision rules," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 93-21, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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